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ABSTRACT
Past research on consumer perceptions related to Low Price Guarantees (LPG) have
primarily investigated effects of LPG on consumer search intentions, their perception of
offer value and their purchase intentions. The present research had two major objectives:
(i) to study the probable effect of LPG on consumers’ intentions to search after the
purchase and the boundary conditions of such effects; (ii) to study probable consequences
of default of an LPG, that is, postpurchase discovery of lower prices in the marketplace
despite promise to the contrary. It was shown that while LPG is likely to discourage
prepurchase search it might encourage postpurchase search, subject to the level of penalty
and consumer value and price consciousness. With respect to an LPG default, factors
such as the location of the default (“within store” versus “between store”), the size of the
default (the difference between the paid price and the later discovered lower price) and
the time of the default (the period of time that elapsed between purchase and discovery of
a lower price) are important and their effects on such consumer perceptions as attitude
toward the retailer, perceived retailer credibility and repurchase intention were
investigated subject to suitable boundary conditions. Two experiments were conducted to
test proposed hypotheses. Theoretical and managerial contributions of the findings are
discussed and suggestions for possible future research are provided.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Market economies are typically characterized by industries that harbor a wide
variety of firms and markets dominated by a variety of retailers. Manufacturers and
retailers attempt to cope with competition in such markets by introducing ever-innovative
tools to attract customers away from their competitors. Low Price Guarantee (LPG)
represents a relatively recent class of pricing tools employed by manufacturers and
retailers in order to attract customers in competitive markets. Known by such different
names as “price matching guarantees” (Chen, Narasimhan and Zhang 2001; KukarKinney and Walters 2003) and “price-matching refund policies” (Jain and Srivastava
2000), LPG has become a common occurrence in both consumer and business markets.
The present research attempts to advance current levels of our understanding of effects of
an LPG on perceptions of end consumers. In this chapter, we will first underscore the
importance of research on consumer perceptions of LPG followed by an attempt to
identify gaps in consumer research in this area that the present research proposes to
address. This is followed by an outline of the aim and scope of the present research.
Finally, a plan of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Importance of Consumer Research on LPG
At present, LPG occurs widely, both at the retailing and upper levels of the
marketing channel. A wide range of products is offered with an accompanying promise of
low prices; and recently, services such as hotels and cruises have adopted the practice
(see, for example, Adams 2002). Such widespread occurrence indicates the practical
significance of researching consumer consequences of an LPG, especially in light of the
fact that much of the earlier research on price guarantees was conducted from the

1

viewpoint of firms where the predominant focus was to study effects of LPGs on
oligopolistic competition (Hess and Gerstner 1991; Jain and Srivastava 2000). From the
standpoint of theory development, the need to research consumer outcomes of an LPG
arises from the fact that despite paramount importance of signaling theory in marketing
and the widespread occurrence of marketplace signals, marketing academia has not
directed as much attention to research of marketplace signaling as is probably deserved
by this area (Kirmani and Rao 2000). The premise of signaling theory and the bulk of
research in economics on marketplace signals have operated from the standpoint of firms
where certain rather rigid assumptions about consumers are included as fixed model
parameters (Spence 1974; Macho-Stradler and Perez-Castrillo 2001). However, there
seems to be an ample scope of research on consumer perceptions of market signals and
consequences thereof, based on the rich tradition of research on consumer psychology.
Furthermore, the bulk of past research on consumer perceptions of market signals seems
to have addressed signals that are based on information asymmetry related to product
quality (Boulding and Kirmani 1993). Low price guarantees have been conceptualized in
past consumer research literature as signals that are based on price-related, rather than
quality-related information asymmetry (for example, Biswas et al. 2002), thereby
allowing a scope to research aspects of consumer processing of signals that might be
hitherto unknown. One such aspect is a recently suggested possibility that consumers
might suspect opportunistic use of a pricing tactic such as an LPG (Biswas, Dutta and
Pullig; working paper). This aspect will be discussed in more detail subsequently.
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Potential Areas for Contribution
Past research has indicated that LPGs may be beneficial to the extent that they
disfavor prepurchase intentions to search for better deals, and raises consumer
perceptions of offer value and their intentions to shop the retailer that offers an LPG
(Biswas et al. 2002; Srivastava and Lurie 2001). However, several issues are in need of
further investigation. The first of these issues relates to a conclusion from past research
that consumers may process an LPG as an “imperfect signal” (Srivastava and Lurie
2001), following a partial lack of empirical support for predicted consumer outcomes
based on arguments rooted in signaling theory. Contrary to their expectations based on
arguments in line with signaling theory, Srivastava and Lurie (2001) found that exposure
to LPG encouraged consumers to search more stores when search costs were low and led
them to search fewer stores when search costs were high. Biswas et al. (2002) also
reported certain findings related to consumer search intention, findings that were
contradictory to their expectations based on the premise of signaling theory. More
recently, Biswas, Dutta and Pullig (working paper) have observed that an LPG appears to
be more effective in favoring consumer perceptions under conditions of lower perceived
price dispersion in the marketplace and these authors have suggested that perhaps,
consumers often view an LPG as an opportunistic tool whereby a retailer is seen as taking
advantage of an existing market price dispersion. Thus, past research on consumer
perceptions of an LPG indicates the need for a fresh perspective on consumer
conceptualization of an LPG and we suggest that the possibility that consumers suspect
an opportunistic implementation of LPG holds promise in this respect. Consequently, the
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present research proposes to incorporate such a possibility related to consumer
conceptualization of an LPG.
The second issue that needs to be addressed relates to probable postpurchase
consumer implications of an LPG. Since an LPG is accompanied by a promise to refund
money should a consumer encounter a lower price after a purchase, an LPG allows
consumers to postpone bargain-hunting until after the purchase (Arbatskaya; working
paper). Although a recently suggested model of LPG that investigates whether the signal
effectively partitions between firms with differential cost structures (Arbatskaya; working
paper) explicitly incorporates the possibility of postpurchase consumer search in model
assumptions, there has been no empirical investigation into postpurchase consumer
search intention in the context of an LPG. Postpurchase search intention has serious
implications for LPG research. It appears reasonable to suggest that postpurchase
searching enhances the likelihood that a consumer encounters a price that is lower than
the price paid under the assurance of an LPG. In other words, postpuchase search
enhances the likelihood of what we term an “LPG default” (based on the concept of
signal defaulting; Kirmani and Rao 2000). What conditions related to such defaulting are
likely to affect consumer outcomes and in what ways? The present research proposes to
address these issues related to postpurchase implications of an LPG, based on their
centrality to the core nature of an LPG.
Finally, there is a need to investigate relevant individual consumer characteristics
that might impose boundary conditions on the effects of an LPG. Since an LPG is a
market signal that rests on information asymmetry based on price-related issues, it is
suggested that such individual characteristics as value consciousness and price
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consciousness (Lichtenstein, Ridgeway and Netemeyer 1993) play a pivotal role in this
regard. Although the roles played by such individual characteristics are worth
investigating both in pre- and postpurchase settings, the present research mostly restricts
itself to postpurchase settings, in line with its stated focus.
The present research has several objectives. First, we investigate the degree to
which an LPG might encourage postpurchase consumer search intention. Next, we
investigate probable consequences that might follow when a consumer detects a lower
price (than the price paid under the assurance of an LPG) after the purchase. Specifically,
we posit that postpurchase detection of a price lower than that paid constitutes default of
the LPG signal (Kirmani and Rao 2000) and such default may adversely affect the
consumer’s overall attitude toward the retailer, their perceptions of retailer credibility and
their repurchase intention. Finally, we attempt to identify factors that might aggravate or
mitigate the probable deleterious effects of an LPG default.
Aim and Scope of Present Research
Although past research has been justifiably concerned with implications of LPG
for consumers’ intentions to search prior to the purchase, it appears that there are
theoretical reasons to justify investigation into implications for postpurchase search.
Given that consumers maintain an account of their losses and gains from transactions and
as a result tend to maximize their acquisition and transaction utilities (Thaler 1985), an
LPG gives consumers an opportunity to do so in a postpurchase setting. Generally, past
research has indicated that consumers are likely to use LPG as a heuristic that helps them
evaluate the need for furthering prepurchase searching and by and large, LPG has been
seen to have acted as a deterrent to further prepurchase searching. However, it is quite
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likely that LPG encourages postpurchase search intention and given the general
uncertainties of the marketplace, such an effect puts the retailer at a somewhat
disadvantageous position. In other words, the probable effect of LPG on postpurchase
search intention is likely to be less beneficial to the retailer than its effect on prepurchase
search intention. Consequently, one of the major objectives of the present research is to
investigate whether an LPG is likely to enhance postpurchase consumer search intention.
Past research has not addressed how relevant individual consumer characteristics
might moderate the effect of LPG on consumer outcomes. In other words, are all
consumers likely to be affected by LPG in the same manner? It has been argued that LPG
helps to discriminate between consumers with different degrees of sensitivity to prices
and hence different knowledge of market prices and different search costs (Png and
Hershleifer 1987). It appears from such argumentation that consumers who are more
sensitive to prices are likely to be more knowledgeable of market prices and also have
lower search costs and such consumers are more likely to utilize LPG in their
prepurchase cognitive processes, given their higher efficacy in evoking the refund
associated with an LPG. Is it possible that such price sensitivity moderates postpurchase
outcomes? The present research investigates the probable role of consumers’ value and
price consciousness (Lichtenstein, Netemeyer and Ridgway 1993) as moderators of
effects of LPG consumer search intention.
The efficacies of LPG as a credible signal rest on an accompanying promise of
refund should the LPG be defaulted, that is, should lower prices be encountered in the
market. However, given that an LPG is a promise made by the retailer and that it entails
such aspects as retailer knowledge of the market and its confidence in that knowledge, is
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it likely that default of an LPG affects consumer perceptions of the retailer? The present
research proposes to investigate probable consumer cognitive consequences of an LPG
default.
Although much of past research has resorted to signaling theory in explaining
consumer outcomes of LPG, it has been indicated that an LPG might be processed by
consumers as “imperfect signals” (Srivastava and Lurie 2001; page 305), following
certain findings that were contrary to prediction based on this theory. According to the
Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM; Friestad and Wright 1994), consumers exposed to
marketing persuasion over time develop persuasion knowledge that enables them to seek
insight into hidden marketer motives and intentions. Is it possible that consumers view
LPG as a tool other than an apparently innocuous signal whose main purpose is to inform
consumers? Specifically, is it possible that consumers view LPG as a persuasive and
opportunistic marketing tool thereby causing them to react cautiously to such a tool?
Preliminary studies (Biswas et al.; working paper) indicate this to be a possibility. The
present research attempts to incorporate this alternate theoretical framework in explaining
probable effects of LPG in a postpurchase setting.
Plan of Subsequent Chapters
Chapter two discusses details of theories used in and findings from past research
on consumer perceptions related to an LPG. Chapter three proposes two conceptual
models, one related to postpurchase consumer search intention and the other related to
consumer cognitive consequences of an LPG default. Further, this chapter develops
several hypotheses related to the proposed conceptual models. Chapter four presents the
procedure and results of an experiment conducted to test hypotheses related to
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postpurchase consumer search intention. Chapter five presents the procedure and results
of a second experiment conducted to test hypotheses related to probable consequences of
LPG default. Finally, chapter six discusses the contribution of the present research,
highlights its limitations and outlines possible areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Past research on issues related to pricing belong to two broad traditions. One of
these traditions is grounded in the economics literature where a significant proportion of
the research attempts to study pricing from the standpoint of firms. The other broad
tradition primarily involves study of consumer perceptions of pricing related phenomena,
owing its origin to such fields as psychology and sociology.
Much of the earliest research on LPG was theoretical, primarily belonging to the
economics based tradition of pricing research (Jain and Srivastava 2000). Comparatively,
past behavioral research on LPG is rather lean. The present chapter discusses past
research on LPG, predominantly focusing on the behavioral tradition, in line with the
primary focus of the current research. The chapter begins with a discussion of the
fundamental nature of an LPG followed by a brief overview of research on LPG from the
perspectives of economics and behavioral disciplines, underscoring theoretical aspects of
the phenomenon that emerged from these bodies of research. Next, the theories hitherto
used in studying consumer cognitive and behavioral consequences of LPG are discussed
followed by a discussion on empirical findings from this body of research.
Fundamental Properties of an LPG
Terms such as “price matching guarantees” (Chen, Narasimhan and Zhang 2001)
and “price matching refund policies” (Jain and Srivastava 2000; Srivastava and Lurie
2001) have been used in the literature to describe the phenomenon of guaranteed low
prices. However, in practice, the phrase “low price guarantee” (LPG; Biswas et al. 2002)
appears to be fairly common. A search on the online search engine “Google”
(http://www.google.com), using the phrase “low price guarantee” leads to hundreds of
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web pages from marketers who actually use the phrase to assert their price
competitiveness. Furthermore, even a cursory scan of promotional information offered by
brick-and-mortar retailers indicates that the phrase “low price guarantee” is widely used.
Consequently, the present research prefers to use the phrase “low price guarantee” (we
prefer to use the acronym “LPG” to facilitate the flow of the manuscript) to refer to any
pricing policy where a marketer indicates to offer a product or a service at the lowest
available price, and offers a suitable compensation should the claim to low price be
disproved.
There is considerable variation in the semantics and structure used to offer price
guarantees in practice. There is also some variation with regard to the amount of
information explicitly provided to the consumer by way of describing conditions of
refund associated with an LPG. First, we will discuss the more prominent variations in
the semantics and structure of price guarantees followed by a discussion on the variations
of initial availability of information. We do not propose a formal classification of LPGs
as such, but address the issue of variations with the purpose of justifying the particular
semantic and structural guarantee to be focused upon in the present research.
One class of price guarantee is characterized by use of the phrase “low price
guarantee” (by far the most prominent and widely occurring in practice) followed by a
stipulation of the refund condition. More often than not, such a message does not
elaborate on the meaning of the phrase “Low Price Guarantee” and oftentimes the
message is framed in a way so as to almost indicate that what the retailer concerned
actually guarantees is that a lower price in the market will be matched. Thus, in such a
case it may not be apparent whether the retailer’s guarantee of offering a low price is by
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virtue of the retailer’s price being actually the lowest (at that point in time) or that the
retailer claims to offer the lowest price by beating or matching a lower price detected by
the consumer. Hence, a retailer might offer a product at a price higher than the average
market price and still satisfy the guarantee condition by matching a lower price detected
by a consumer. However, whatever retailers’ motives in using LPGs, it appears
reasonable to assume that the consumer is likely to perceive the use of the phrase “low
price guarantee” as a guarantee that the retailer’s price is positioned proximally to the
lowest extremity of the existing price dispersion for the product (brand) in the market.
A second class of price guarantee uses the phrase “low price guarantee” and also
explicitly asserts the retailer’s confidence in the offered price being actually the lowest.
However, a refund condition is also stated just in case the guarantee is defaulted.
A third class of price guarantee does not use the phrase “low price guarantee” but
uses phrases such as “we will match any competitor’s price” or “we will beat any
competitor’s price” or “nobody beats our price” and then states the refund condition in
bold print or fine print. This form of an LPG seems to signal an implicit claim that the
price offered by the retailer is the lowest.
Irrespective of the semantics and structure associated with a price guarantee or the
terminology used in past literature to describe this widespread pricing technique, it is our
understanding that such a guarantee necessarily signals to the consumer an explicit or
implicit claim on the part of the retailer that the offered price is indeed likely to be the
lowest in the market. An argument in favor of our understanding is that a simple price
matching policy does not give consumers a compelling reason to shop the retailer
offering the price guarantee, especially when the refund constitutes just the difference
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between the guaranteed price and a lower price located elsewhere in the market. Thus, if
retailer “X” offers an LPG on a certain product and promises to match any competitor’s
price, there is no good reason for a consumer to purchase the product from “X” when the
consumer has knowledge that retailer “Y” offers the product at a price lower than that
charged by “X”, everything else being constant between the retailers. This is especially
true in light of the fact that claiming a refund involves certain costs (by way of time and
effort) on the part of the consumer. The situation changes slightly when “X” promises a
refund in excess of the price difference between the two retailers. Even though the
consumer would financially benefit by buying the product from “X” in such a case, and is
likely to do so, it is reasonable to assume that retailers would not usually want to make
such monetary sacrifice and would indeed strive to offer a low price to begin with. Thus,
whether or not a retailer explicitly states that his or hers is the lowest available price,
there appears to be an implicit understanding to such an effect. Past empirical research
indicates that consumers do indeed have such an understanding when they are exposed to
an advertisement that uses the phrase “low price guarantee” but does not elaborate on its
meaning. None of the past studies (Biswas et al. 2002; Jain and Srivastava 2000;
Srivastava and Lurie 2001) used an experimental stimulus that elaborated the claim that
the offered price was the lowest in the market but results from these studies indicated that
subjects who were exposed in to these stimuli did indeed presume such a claim. In sum, it
appears that despite semantic and structural variations, price guarantees generate an
implicit understanding in consumers that the offered price is proximal to the lower
extremity of marketplace price dispersion for the product (brand) in question.
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Apart from variation related to semantics and structure of price guarantees, there
may be some variation with regard to how much total information related to the low price
guarantee is readily available to the consumer and in the form in which such information
is available. For instance, a consumer might come across an ad that uses the phrase “we
will match any competitor’s price”. However, the refund condition may or may not be
stated, and if stated, may be present in fine print. Another situation may be considered
where a consumer drives by a tire store and reads the claim “low price guarantee”. The
consumer might decide or act on an assumed understanding of such a guarantee (for
example, if circumstances demand quick decision making) and may not verify details of
terms and conditions associated with the guarantee. Determinants of the degree of
availability of information related to a price guarantee may involve marketer’s choice to
provide information, consumer’s willingness to seek additional information, consumer’s
propensity to decide or act on an assumed understanding of the guarantee and situational
factors.
Variation in the semantics and structure of offered price guarantees and variations
in the extent of information available to consumers impart a certain degree of difficulty to
empirical investigation of consumer perceptions of such guarantees, especially in view of
the possibility that such variations may have considerable effect on consumer
perceptions. Whereas there appears to be a need to research probable effects of such
variations on consumer perceptions, the present research focuses on a particular form of
LPG whereby the advertisement to be used (the experimental stimulus) is made to
employ the phrase “low price guarantee” (in consonance with the rather widespread use
and shared understanding of the term) and also explicitly states the refund condition. This
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appears to be a good starting point for understanding the effects of price guarantees with
scope for future research on probable effects of semantic, structural and informationrelated variations of price guarantees.
Despite variations discussed above, it may be possible to identify certain common
characteristics of LPGs. First, an LPG may be applicable to a single product or brand or
may be applicable across a range of products or brands. Preliminary investigation shows
that online guarantees tend to be more or less product and/or brand specific whereas
guarantees offered by brick-and-mortar retailers apply across the range of merchandise
offered by the retailer.
Second, an LPG is usually associated with promise for a refund should the
consumer locate a price lower than the guaranteed low price. Such a refund condition has
been viewed in past literature as a “penalty condition” whereby the marketer is seen to
penalize herself for defaulting the low price guarantee. When conceptualized as a penalty
condition, a refund appears to underscore retailer confidence in her guarantee of a low
price (Biswas et al. 2002). However, it is likely that refund conditions are designed to
seek another purpose. Specifically, the refund condition seeks to take the attribute of
price out of the set of factors affecting consumer’s choice of the marketer offering the
price guarantee. Thus, if consumer “A” is considering purchase of a product from retailer
“X”, a refund related to an LPG appears to send the message to the consumer that she
need not worry about the price but can focus on other aspects related to making a choice.
Hence, if the consumer has decided to purchase the product from the retailer based on
other considerations, there is no reason for the consumer to revoke her decision on the
basis of price.
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Regardless of how a refund is conceptualized, as a penalty condition or as an
attempt to simplify consumer decision making, it is an integral part of any existing price
guarantee. We retain the conceptualization of refunds as self-imposed penalties by
retailers, in accordance with past research. Depending on the extent of the refund,
penalties related to LPGs have been categorized as being implicit or explicit (Biswas et
al. 2002). An implicit penalty is one that is not explicitly stated by a retailer, is assumed
by a consumer and where the exact difference between an offer price accompanied by an
LPG and a later encountered lower price is refunded to the consumer. An explicit penalty
is one that is clearly stated by the retailer and where the refund exceeds this difference by
some proportion of the offer price. Although not the focus of the present research, such a
classification of LPG penalties deserves attention for the following reason. The semantic
connotation of the “explicit-implicit” dichotomy does not appear to be directly related to
the level of penalty accompanying an LPG. It is our position that whether or not an LPG
can be labeled as “explicit” or “implicit” ought to depend on the extent of information
available to a consumer and as discussed earlier, variations in this regard can have several
determinants. Thus, the same penalty condition may be implicit or explicit to a consumer
depending on the extent of information made available to the consumer and also on the
consumers’ willingness to seek additional information. It follows that even an LPG with a
high level of penalty (for example, one that promises to refund 150% of the difference)
may remain implicit to a consumer who is unaware of such a guarantee. In order to avoid
any confusion that might arise from an assumed semantic connotation of the “explicitimplicit” dichotomy, the present research addresses a penalty in terms of the “level”, the
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level being determined by the proportion of the price difference that is promised as a
refund.
A third important characteristic of an LPG is constituted by the spatial and
temporal boundaries associated with the penalty. When offered by a brick-and-mortar
retailer, an LPG assures the lowest price in the “local market”, usually defining the
spatial extent of such a market in terms of a measure of distance. Marketers offering
online LPGs vary with regard to their definition of the spatial extent of validity of their
claim. Thus, while some marketers restrict themselves to specific internet retailers
(example, buy.com;http://www.buy.com/corp/support/guarantees/lowpriceguarantee.asp),
others expand their coverage to both brick-and-mortar and online retailers (example,
autoanything; http://www.autoanything.com/365.asp) and yet others restrict themselves
to online retailers only but extending such coverage to international retailers (example,
hobby-lobby; http://www.hobby-lobby.com/lowprice.htm). There also appears to be
considerable variation with respect to the temporal boundary associated with the penalty.
Thus, while a 30-day time period appears to be widespread (online and otherwise), LPGs
have been seen to be valid for as short as 24 hours in the hotel industry (Adams 2002)
and as long as 365 days (example, autoanything; http://www.autoanything.com/365.asp).
With this understanding of the fundamental nature of an LPG, discussion
proceeds with an overview of past research on LPG.
Overview of Past Research on LPG
Much of the past research on LPG is based in the economics literature where the
predominant concern has been providing an explanation of the effects of LPGs on the
market as a whole, predominantly from the standpoint of firms. This body of literature
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has been concerned with two broad issues related to LPGs: the effect of such pricing
strategies on market competition and price levels and the ability of LPGs to discriminate
between two broad categories of consumers (Jain and Srivastava 2000). Each of these
streams is briefly described next.
It has been argued that LPGs may be used by firms in an oligopoly to collude
among themselves and charge higher prices, thereby maximizing joint profits (Salop
1986; Hess and Garstner 1991). This is easily demonstrated with the help of two firms (a
duopoly). Let us suppose that two firms, A and B, both offer LPGs and both have set a
price of $X for a certain item. Since this price ($X) is the only price in the market,
consumers cannot claim refunds from either of the firms by discovering lower prices in
the market. However, the terms of the price guarantees are not violated. Under this
scenario, therefore, neither firm has an incentive to reduce prices and so long as both
continue to offer LPGs, neither has an incentive to raise prices. In other words, it is
possible to achieve Nash equilibrium with the market price set a high level. Possible
consequences of such a scenario, therefore, are a reduced level of market competition and
a generally high (compared to costs) level of price in the market.
Another view of LPGs is based on their ability to discriminate between consumers
based on their search costs (Png and Hirshleifer 1987). It has been argued that since only
consumers with low search costs (that is, consumers with higher knowledge of market
prices and who are more sensitive to prices) will be able to take advantage of LPG related
refunds, firms offering these guarantees will attract such consumers thereby allowing for
the possibility that consumers with higher search costs (that is, consumers with lower
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knowledge of market prices and who are less sensitive to prices) are charged higher
prices by firms that do not offer LPGs.
In contrast to research in economics that has addressed implications of LPGs
from the standpoint of firms, behavioral research on this pricing phenomenon addressed
the overall question: how do consumers perceive LPGs? Specifically, past research has
focused on the effects of LPG on consumer perceptions of store price image, their
intentions to search, their perceptions of value and their intentions to transact with the
retailer.
Jain and Srivastava (2000) studied the effects of LPGs partly based on behavioral
considerations and partly based on econometric modeling. Based on two experiments,
these authors showed that stores offering LPGs are likely to be perceived as having lower
price image and are likely to favor consumers’ purchase intentions and their store choice.
Additionally, LPG was not found to have any effect on perceptions of overall store
quality and service quality. Srivastava and Lurie (2001) partly replicated these findings
by showing that LPG led to perceptions of lower store prices. Additionally, they found
that LPG led to a higher likelihood of discontinuing search regardless of the base price of
the product. Further, these researchers found that LPG favors consumers’ intentions to
search when search costs are low and disfavors such intentions when search costs are
high. Biswas et al. (2002) found that LPG led to lower search intentions, higher
perceptions of value and higher shopping intentions and identified certain boundary
conditions (in the form of moderators) for such effects. Kukar-Kinney and Walters
(2003) examined effects of refund depth (elsewhere termed “penalty level”; Biswas et al.
2002) associated with an LPG (they used the phrase “price matching guarantee”) and the
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competitive scope of an LPG on perceived believability of LPG, consumer perceptions of
value and consumer intention to patronize the retailer. These authors found that a deeper
refund is viewed by consumers more skeptically (thereby similarly affecting consumer
perceptions of value and their intention to patronize the retailer), such an effect being
stronger with diminishing strength of retailer reputation; however, the competitive scope
of an LPG was found to favor consumer perceptions of value but had no effect on
perceived believability of the guarantee. More recently, a process model of the effects of
LPG has been suggested, whereby it is posited that consumer perceptions of risk and their
estimates of market prices mediate the effects of LPG on consumer perceptions of value,
their search intention and their shopping intention. (Biswas, Dutta and Pullig; working
paper).
With this overview of past research on LPG, attention is focused upon the theories
that have been used in explaining behavioral implications of LPG.
Theories Used in Past Consumer Research on LPG
Published behavioral research on LPG has primarily relied on the economics of
information framework (Stigler 1961) and signaling theory (Spence 1974; Kirmani and
Rao 2000) in explaining their effects on consumer perceptions (Srivastava and Lurie
2001; Biswas et al. 2002). The basic tenets of each of the theories are first discussed
followed by a discussion of their relevance to an LPG.
Stigler’s (1961) economics of information framework proposes that consumers
search for information only to the point where the marginal cost of searching is equal to
or just exceeds the marginal benefit of searching. The framework also proposes that seller
heterogeneity is not the only reason for market price variation; consumers vary in their
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evaluation of search costs and search benefits thereby leading to a variation in the extent
to which they actually search the market for prices. This results in variation in market
price knowledge among consumers. Knowledge of such variance in consumers’ market
price knowledge allows sellers to charge less knowledgeable consumers higher prices and
more knowledgeable consumers lower prices, thereby creating market price variation.
According to this framework, therefore, consumers’ intentions to search should be
reduced if they perceive that furthering search is not likely to be incrementally beneficial.
It has been posited that an LPG suggests little benefits of furthering search. Thus,
consumers exposed to an LPG are more likely to have a lower benefit – cost differential
(related to search) than those who are not, thereby indicating that the former group would
be less likely to search than the latter group. However, before consumers can use an LPG
in this way, they must have some assurance as to its reliability as a piece of information.
Signaling theory offers an explanation as to how this might occur.
Signaling theory belongs to the broader paradigm of information economics, an
emerging approach in economics that emphasizes dynamics related to market transactions
characterized by some form of information asymmetry between parties subject to such
transactions (Kirmani and Rao 2000; Macho-Stradler and Perez-Castrillo 2001). The
basic premise of information economics is as follows: transactions are often accompanied
by information asymmetry, whereby the parties involved differ in terms of the amount
and nature of information they possess; when one party (A) lacks some information that
the other party (B) has, party A makes some inferences about party B based on any
information provided by party B (to fill in for the missing information) and this inference
formation should play a role in further information that party B may choose to provide.
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Signaling theory relates to marketers’ responses to any information asymmetry that might
exist between themselves and the consumers and consequences of such responses
(Kirmani and Rao 2000).) In marketing, a potential situation for information asymmetry
arises when marketers possess certain knowledge or skills that are only imperfectly
known or completely unknown to buyers (Boulding and Kirmani 1993; Spence 1974).
Given that such information asymmetry might prevent consummation of transactions,
especially repeated ones, marketers often attempt to dispel such asymmetry by
undertaking certain actions that are called “signals”. In short, therefore, the primary
purpose of signals is to help minimize information asymmetry between marketers and
buyers. This, in turn, is expected to influence buyer attitudes and behaviors in such a way
as to ensure consummation of transactions, one or multiple times.
Past literature in both economics and marketing have predominantly focused on
marketers’ use of signals in the context of information asymmetry that exists with respect
to unobservable quality of a marketer’s offering (Kirmani and Rao 2000). In this context,
the role played by signals is to resolve a common problem faced by consumers, that of
distinguishing high and low quality sellers. Viewed this way, a strategy becomes a signal
only when the strategy is beneficial to one group of sellers but not to another group of
sellers (Boulding and Kirmani 1993). Thus, whereas the former group has an incentive to
adopt the strategy the latter does not, thereby leading to differential strategies between the
two groups of sellers and consequently helping consumers distinguish between the two
groups of sellers. Thus, a signal creates a “separating equilibrium” in the marketplace
whereby firms differentiated on the basis of the signal have no incentive to depart from
their current strategies (Macho-Stradler and Perez-Castrillo 2001).
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Past literature in marketing has conceptualized an LPG as a signal (Biswas et al.
2002; Biswas, Dutta and Pullig---working paper; Jain and Srivastava 2000; Srivastava
and Lurie 2001). With regard to an LPG, a fundamental source of information asymmetry
concerns retailers’ assumptions about consumers’ knowledge with regard to the precise
location of a retailer’s advertised price in the market price dispersion. It is well
established in the pricing literature that consumers bring in a range of internal price
estimates to the transaction. However, whereas the retailer’s knowledge of market price
dispersion may be objective, that of consumers may be perceived, given the varied extent
of search undertaken by consumers under different evaluations of benefits and cost of
search (Stigler 1961). In other words, there may be an asymmetry with regard to the
information possessed by retailers and consumers about market price variations. Given
such an asymmetry, and the possibility that retailers may be better informed about market
price variations, an asymmetry appears to be likely with regard to the retailer’s
knowledge of the location of its price in the price dispersion and consumers’ knowledge
of the same. Put simply, the retailer is fully aware of its superior knowledge, compared to
consumers, about the precise location of the offer price in the continuum of market
prices. Thus, it is fundamentally the retailer’s perceptions of an information asymmetry
with regard to such location that prompts an action (a signal) such as offering a low price
guarantee.
How does conceptualization of LPG as a signal measure up in light of the
traditional conceptualization of a signal being a strategy that creates differential incentive
structure across marketers (Boulding and Kirmani 1993)? Recent empirical evidence
indicates that at equilibrium, firms offering LPGs offer lower prices and enjoy lower
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costs than firms that do not offer such guarantees (Arbatskaya; working paper) thereby
indicating such guarantees’ ability to create a “separating equilibrium” in the market.
It must be noted at this point that based on discussions in Biswas et al. (2002), and
based on the perspective of signaling, we view the guarantee that the retailer’s price is the
lowest (whether or not it is explicitly mentioned) as being conceptually distinct from the
penalty condition that accompanies such a guarantee. Specifically, we posit that the price
guarantee signals a retailer’s beliefs of superior market knowledge and its beliefs about
its ability to offer low prices. The penalty, on the other hand, strengthens the price
guarantee by signaling the retailer’s confidence in such beliefs. It is such a confidence
that allows the retailer to self-impose a penalty that if invoked, is likely to cost the
retailer, especially in monetary terms. As will be discussed in detail in the following
chapter, this distinction leads to the position that default of an LPG (which occurs with a
consumer’s postpurchase discovery of a lower price) is likely to have consumer
consequences that are distinct from any defaulting related to retailer behaviors
concerning the actual refund process.
Kirmani and Rao (2000) have proposed a typology of signals of unobservable
quality used in marketing. Although an LPG is not a quality signal, it might still be
possible to identify it as a particular type of signal, based on the proposed typology. We
present a brief description of the typology and then attempt to identify the type of signal
an LPG is likely to be.
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Signals

Default-Independent

Sale-Independent

Default-Contingent

Sale-Contingent

Revenue-Risking

Cost-Risking

Figure 2.1. Schematic Representation of Proposed Typology of Signals of
Unobservable Quality (based on Kirmani and Rao 2000).
Figure 2.1 provides a schematic representation of Kirmani and Rao’s (2000)
typology. As shown in the figure, signals may be of two broad types: default-independent
signals and default-contingent signals. Default-Independent signals may be of two types:
sale-independent signals and sale-contingent signals. Also, default-contingent signals of
two types: revenues-risking signals and cost-risking signals.
Default-independent signals are those for which the firm incurs an up-front
expenditure before or while providing the signal and costs are incurred by the firm
irrespective of whether the signals are defaulted. Sale-independent default-independent
signals are actions that occur regardless of whether anyone buys the product. Examples
are advertising expenditures and investment in brand names. In the case of salecontingent default-independent signals, the expenditure associated with the signal occurs
at the time of the sale and the seller plans to recover signal costs through future profits.
Examples are low introductory price and slotting allowances (up-front fees paid by the
manufacturer to the grocery store retailer for access to shelf space for new products).
Default-contingent signals are costless at the time the signal is transmitted but
involves costs if the signal is defaulted at a future point in time (as might happen if a
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product turns out to be of poor quality). A revenue-risking default-contingent signal is
one where the seller stands to lose revenue in case of default of the signal. With respect to
signals of unobservable quality, an example of this type of signal is price charged by a
high-quality seller. Should the product turn out to be of poor quality, consumers
repurchase intention is likely to be adversely affected, thereby leading to a loss in future
revenue. Cost-risking default-contingent signals do not involve monetary expenditures
up-front yet credibly convey the information that false claims would involve a direct cost
to the firm. Examples of this type of signal are performance warranties and money-back
guarantees.
Since a firm is not likely to incur substantial up-front costs by offering an LPG
and default of an LPG is likely to prove costly to the firm, an LPG may be classified as a
default-contingent signal. It is difficult, however, to discern whether an LPG is likely to
be a revenue-risking or a cost-risking signal or both. An LPG is certainly a cost-risking
default-contingent signal since defaulting of an LPG (which occurs when a price lower
than the offer price is encountered) is costs the firm in monetary terms, by way of the
self-imposed penalty condition. An LPG could also be classified as a revenue-risking
default-contingent signal if its default lowers consumer repurchase intention. Such a
possibility has not yet been empirically investigated and since exploring this possibility is
one of the purposes of the present research, we hope to gain some insight into this aspect
after completion of the empirical studies proposed in Chapter 4.
With this background on the role of signaling theory in investigation of LPGs,
findings from past behavioral research on LPG are discussed next.
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Findings from Past Consumer Research on LPG
Past research on consumer perceptions of LPG has investigated several important
aspects of such perceptions. First, we provide a detailed account of the studies conducted
so far and findings thereof. This is followed by a summary of the findings, especially
indicating LPG-related research themes that are yet to be investigated.
Jain and Srivastava (2000) conducted two experiments in order to investigate
the effect of LPG on consumer perceptions of overall store prices, purchase intention,
store choice and perceptions of store quality.
The purpose of their first experiment was to investigate if LPG affects
consumers’ perceptions of overall store prices and their purchase intention. In this
experiment, subjects were asked to imagine a scenario in which they were shopping for a
new television set. Description of an electronic store was provided, with an additional
statement about the refund policy in case of the LPG (experimental) condition. Results
demonstrated that exposure to an LPG increased consumers’ confidence of finding lower
prices at the store and also favored their intentions to purchase from the store. In other
words, as predicted by the authors, LPG was found to favorably affect consumer
perceptions of overall store prices.
The purpose of the second experiment was to investigate if consumers were more
likely to choose a store that offered an LPG over a store that did not and whether
exposure to an LPG affected consumer perceptions of overall store and service quality. In
this experiment, subjects were asked to imagine that they were shopping for a DVD
player. Descriptions of two stores (for comparison shopping) were provided to both the
experimental and the control groups, with an additional description of the LPG offered by
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one of the stores in the experimental condition. Results indicated that consumers were
more likely to choose the store that offered an LPG. However, consumers’ perceptions of
store quality (products and services) were not affected by the LPG.
Srivastava and Lurie (2001) conducted three experiments to investigate the
effects of LPG on consumers’ search-related intentions and behaviors. Their first
experiment used a computer simulation to test whether exposure to an LPG (i) affected
consumers’ perceptions of overall store prices; (ii) affected consumer’s intentions to
discontinue search and whether LPG interacted with the base price of the product in
affecting consumers’ search. It was predicted that LPG would favor perceptions of
overall store prices and disfavor consumers’ intentions to search. Also, it was predicted
that LPG would be used as a heuristic to discourage search only when base price was low
(that is, price dispersion of the product was low, or in other words, benefits of further
search were not deemed to be high) but not when the base price was high. As expected,
results indicated LPG to lower consumers’ estimates of overall store prices and
discourage their intentions to search for better deals. However, base price was seen to
have no effect on the use of LPG as a heuristic. In other words, regardless of the
perceived benefits of further search, LPG was used as a heuristic in discouraging
intentions to search further.
The primary purpose of the second experiment was to see if LPG interacted with
search costs in affecting intentions to search. Based on signaling theory, the authors
argued that signals are likely to be more effective when market disciplinary mechanisms
(such as consumers withholding purchase, spreading negative word-of-mouth, etc.) for
false signaling are stronger. In case of LPGs, since disciplinary mechanisms enforceable
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by consumers are likely to be stronger when search costs are lower (since consumers can
easily search to verify if lower prices exist) than when they are higher, LPG is likely to be
more effective in disfavoring search when search costs are lower. Contrary to their
expectations, the authors found that exposure to LPG encouraged consumers to search
more stores when search costs were low and led them to search fewer stores when search
costs were high. An explanation was offered for this unexpected finding in terms of
consumers’ cost-benefit analysis. It is possible that with higher search costs, the costbenefit differential was perceived to exceed zero, thereby increasing consumers’
propensity to rely on LPG as a heuristic. At lower search costs, search benefits might
have been perceived to exceed search costs thereby giving consumers little incentive to
rely on LPG. The authors’ third experiment replicated the findings from their second
experiment.
Biswas et al. (2002) investigated the effects of LPG on consumers’ perceptions of
value of a focal offer, their intention to search for better deals and their intention to
purchase from the retailer offering the LPG and also studied the moderating effects of
reference price and store price image on such effects.
Results of their first study indicated that exposure to an LPG led to more
favorable perceptions of offer value and higher shopping intention and these effects were
stronger when the advertisement did not refer to any other external price or when a small
reference price was mentioned than when a high but plausible reference price was
mentioned. This indicated that a high but plausible reference price acted as a cue highly
diagnostic of the favorable nature of the deal, thereby making reliance on an additional
cue such as an LPG unnecessary. In contrast, when reference price was low or absent,

28

consumers relied on the LPG as an additional cue in order to evaluate the offer. Together,
the findings indicated a main effect of LPG on consumer perceptions of value and their
shopping intention, being favorable with respect to both outcomes. The findings
regarding consumers’ intentions to search for better deals were, however, contrary to
expectations. It was predicted that LPG would more strongly discourage search intention
when reference price was absent or low than when reference price was high. However,
exposure to LPG led to lower intentions to search when reference price was high and had
no effect on such intentions when reference price was low or absent.
The authors’ second study investigated the moderating role of store price image
on the effects of LPG. It was predicted that an LPG would favor perceptions of offer
value and intentions to shop and also discourage intentions to search only when such
LPG was offered by a store associated with high prices (that is, a high price image store)
but not when offered by a store normally associated with low prices (that is, a low price
image store). However, as predicted, the effects on perceived value and shopping
intention were observed only in case of a high price image store, findings with regard to
search intentions contradicted expectations. Results indicated that while LPG from a low
price image store led to lower intentions to search, that from a high price image store led
to higher search intentions. Interestingly, this finding with regard to search intention once
again refuted the earlier stated proposition based on signaling theory (Srivastava and
Lurie 2001): signals subject to stronger market disciplinary actions are likely to be more
effective. High price image stores are likely to be perceived as being more vulnerable to
disciplinary actions (should an LPG be defaulted) owing to the higher likelihood of being
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undercut on prices and hence their signals ought to be more effective. However, this
premise was refuted with regard to consumers’ search intention.
Kukar-Kinney and Walters (2003; forthcoming) conducted a study to
investigate the effect of “refund depth” (elsewhere termed “penalty level”; Biswas et al.
2002) and “competitive scope” (defined as the number of competitors whose prices an
LPG claims to match or beat) of an LPG (these authors used the term “price matching
guarantee” instead of the term “low price guarantee”) on believability of the price
guarantee, perceive value of the deal, and intention to patronize the retailer. In a 2 (LPG
with low refund and LPG with high refund) x 2 (LPG with low competitive scope and
LPG with high competitive scope) between-subjects experimental design, subjects were
exposed to a scenario and subject responses were collected using paper-and-pencil
measures. Findings from the experiment indicated that a high refund was discounted by
the subjects and hence made the price guarantee less believable although competitive
scope had no effect on perceived believability of the price guarantee. Furthermore, the
authors found that higher refund and higher competitive scope lead to higher levels of
perceived value. Additionally, the authors showed that a more credible price guarantee is
likely to favor value perception and both believability of the price guarantee and
perceptions of the guarantee value positive affect consumer intention to patronize the
retailer. Several comments can be made on the authors’ propositions and findings:
(a)

The authors did not elaborate on the precise meaning of “believability of
guarantee”. To understand the need for such an elaboration, one needs to
understand the exact object of possible disbelief. Specifically, are consumers
likely to disbelieve the claim (explicit or implicit) that the offered price is the
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lowest or are the consumers likely to disbelieve the claim that a refund will be
made? This is especially important in light of our earlier discussion on the
need to view the guarantee of low price as being conceptually distinct from
the refund condition that accompanies such a guarantee. The contributory
value of the authors’ findings becomes somewhat questionable if the refund is
the likely object of disbelief. This is because most LPG refund clauses are
stated in precise terms and qualification criteria for refunds do not usually
appear to be disputable. Given the rather stringent regulatory conditions under
which businesses function in the U.S. economy, are consumers likely to doubt
realization of refund, provided qualifying criteria are satisfied?
(b)

The authors’ first hypothesis stated that a higher refund is likely to make the
price guarantee less believable and their third hypothesis stated that a higher
refund is likely to make the price guarantee seem more valuable. This raises
the question: are consumers likely to find value in something that is not
believable to start with? The logical inconsistency indicated by the authors’
first and third hypotheses is confirmed by their fourth hypothesis which stated
that a price guarantee perceived to be more believable is also likely to be
perceived as being more valuable. Quite obviously, not all of the hypotheses
referred to here can receive support in a valid empirical study. Surprisingly,
however, the authors found support for all of these hypotheses. This casts
grave doubts on the contribution of the authors’ findings in this regard.

(c)

It is interesting that the authors’ findings with regard to the effect of refund
depth on LPG believability contradict arguments based on conceptualization
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of an LPG as a signal (Biswas et al. 2002). According to Biswas et al. (2002),
a higher refund is likely to render strength and impart credibility to an LPG
based on the rationale that no business probably wants to incur a penalty,
especially when such a penalty can assume both monetary and non-monetary
forms. In other words, since a refund, especially, a higher one, implies
increased cost to the retailer, retailers are not likely to risk their profitability
by promising a high refund if they are not confident of their prices being the
lowest. This indicates, in line with Srivastava and Lurie’s (2001) earlier
observation, that consumers process an LPG as an imperfect signal.
More recently, a process model of LPG effects has been posited and tested
(Biswas, Dutta and Pullig; working paper). According to this model, the effects of
LPG on consumer perceptions of offer value, their intentions to search and shop are
mediated by consumer perceptions of financial risk and their estimate of the lowest
market price. Specifically, it was posited that LPG reduces perceived financial risk of the
deal and consumer estimates of the lowest available market price thereby favoring
perceived value and shopping intention and discouraging search intention. Findings from
studies conducted thus far have generally supported the posited model.
Based on the “Persuasion Knowledge Model” (PKM) of Friestad and Wright
(1994), these authors also posited that the effects of LPG would be stronger when
consumers’ estimates of market price dispersion were lower since low price dispersion
gave less incentive to the retailer in being opportunistic. Findings from empirical studies
by these authors thus far have supported this line of argument. As was discussed earlier,
this perspective of consumer suspicion of an element of opportunism in the use of an
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LPG is likely to enrich our understanding of consumer processing of market signals and
is an area of potential research in the future.
The following is a summary of findings from past consumer research on LPG:


Low Price Guarantees generally act as signals of low prices and thereby raise
consumers’ expectations of finding lower prices at the advertising store, their
perceptions of deal value and their intentions to shop the advertiser.



Several boundary conditions (search costs, level of reference price, store price
image, refund depth, competitive scope and consumers’ perceived price
dispersion) have been identified with respect to LPG’s effects on key
consumer outcomes.



Findings with regard to LPG’s effect on search intention and its believability,
however, indicate that LPG acts as an imperfect signal for consumers.
Contrary to predictions based on signaling theory, the effectiveness of LPG in
discouraging search intention was found to be higher when search costs were
higher and also when the LPG was offered by a store normally associated with
low prices. Also, contrary to arguments based on the conceptualization of an
LPG as a signal, an LPG with a higher refund was discounted by consumers
and was perceived as being less believable than one with a lower refund.

Thus, past research on consumer perceptions of LPG indicate the need for further
investigation into alternate perspectives on how consumers process marketplace signals.
As indicated by an ongoing research (Biswas, Dutta and Pullig; working paper),
consumers’ suspicion of an element of opportunism in retailer usage of an LPG is likely
to play a vital role in this regard. Furthermore, despite obvious postpurchase implications
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of an LPG, past research has not addressed this issue. Last but not the least, there is a
need to investigate the role played by individual traits in consumer perceptions of an
LPG. The present research attempts to contribute to these areas.
With this overview of findings from past behavioral research on LPG, the
following chapter presents conceptual models on the effect of LPG on consumer
postpurchase search intention and probable consequences of LPG default and the chapter
also develops hypotheses related to the proposed models.
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL MODELS AND HYPOTHESES
Two conceptual models are presented in order to posit effects of LPG on
consumer postpurchase search intention and the effects of LPG default on consumer
perceptions. Model 1 (Figure 3.1) suggests that presence of LPG affects both consumers’
pre- and postpurchase search intentions and when an LPG is offered, the level of penalty
affects consumer search intentions. Furthermore, the effects of LPG and penalty level on
consumer search intentions are moderated by consumers’ value consciousness and their
price consciousness.

Value
Consciousness
Prepurchase
Search Intention

LPG
--Absent
--Present:
 100%
penalty level
 150%
penalty level

Postpurchase
Search Intention

Price
Consciousnes

Figure 3.1. Model 1: The Effects of LPG and Penalty Level on Pre- and
Postpurchase Search Intentions

35

Overall
Attitude
Toward
Retailer

Default Size

Perceived
Retailer
Credibility

Default
Time
Default
Location

Repurchase
Intention

Figure 3.2. Model 2: The Effects of LPG Default on Postpurchase Consumer
Perceptions
Model 2 (Figure 3.2) posits the probable effects of LPG default on consumer
perceptions. As discussed in detail subsequently, the present research posits that
consumers generally conceptualize an LPG as a genuine signaling tool whereby the
marketer is seen to face a situation of information asymmetry and that she attempts to
overcome through a signal such as the LPG. However, based on the Persuasion
Knowledge Model (PKM; Friestad and Wright 1994), the present research also proposes
that consumers may also view an LPG as an opportunistic tool and that such an
opportunistic perception of LPG cohabit in their consciousness with the other, more
supportive notion of LPG but is not activated until the consumer encounters an LPG
default at a store other than that where the product was purchased under the assurance of
an LPG. Model 2 (figure 2) depicts the relationships among constructs that are relevant to
an LPG default and its probable consequences. As discussed in subsequent sections, these
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relationships may be explained by signaling theory, economics of information theory and
the PKM. The model posits that default location (whether the default is detected at the
store offering the LPG or at another store in the market) will influence postpurchase
consumer perceptions of the retailer and their repurchase intention and that these
relationships will be moderated by default size (the algebraic difference between the paid
price and the later discovered lower price). We further propose that default time (the
period of time that elapses between a purchase and the detection of a default) will
moderate the interaction between default location and default size. The rationale behind
the posited relationships will be unfolded in the next section that attempts to formulate
specific hypotheses related to the proposed relationships.
Hypotheses
LPG and Postpurchase Search Intentions
Given the essential nature of LPG in its emphasis on fulfillment of commitment
even after consummation of the purchase, a natural research question is: how might an
LPG affect consumers’ postpurchase price related cognitions? Specifically, the present
research seeks to investigate the probable effects of an LPG on consumers’ postpurchase
search intentions.
We posit that when a purchase is made under the assurance of an LPG,
postpurchase intentions to search for price-related information are likely to be higher than
when such an assurance is absent. The rationale for this position is based on consumers’
tendencies to maximize acquisition and transaction values (Lichtenstein, Netemeyer and
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Burton 1990; Thaler 1985). Perceived acquisition value1 may be defined as the algebraic
difference between the totality of perceived benefits from a product or service (an
acquisition), also termed as the “get” component (Zeithaml 1988), and the money given
up to acquire the product or service (Grewal, Monroe and Krishnan 1998). Since an LPG
usually promises, at the very minimum, a refund of the difference between the paid price
and a lower market price, and assuming that the consumer is generally satisfied with the
product2, perceived acquisition utility is likely to be boosted in two ways: the refund
augments one’s assessment of overall benefits from the transaction (because now the
consumer has received the benefits of the product and some additional money; thus, the
“get” component of the value equation is raised) and from paying the lower price, the
“give” component is reduced, thereby resulting in an increase in their algebraic difference
or ratio.
Perceived transaction value has been defined as the perception of psychological
satisfaction or pleasure obtained from taking advantage of the financial terms of the price
deal (Grewal, Monroe and Krishnan 1998). When a purchase is made under the assurance
of an LPG, anticipated psychological satisfaction is likely to be enhanced by the refund
and the positive feelings associated with having paid a lower price for the product. This
indicates that an inherent tendency to maximize transaction value is likely to prompt
consumers to seek situations that lead to realization of the promised refund. Since this is

1

Throughout the text, the terms acquisition (transaction) value and acquisition (transaction) utility are used
interchangeably. The terms acquisition value and transaction value (Grewal, Monroe and Krishnan 1998)
appear to be more comprehensive, and are hence used here.
2

This assumption of consumer satisfaction with the purchased product is necessary to ensure that the
consumer need not resort to other refund-related schemes, such as “money back guarantee” and normal
store return policies. Empirical procedures to be adopted for hypotheses testing ought to incorporate such
an assumption.
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possible by locating a lower price, the consumer is likely to seek such a price after the
purchase. Thus, consumers’ postpurchase intentions to search are likely to be enhanced
by an anticipated enhancement of their perceived transaction value3.
In sum, while presence of an LPG is likely to discourage consumer prepurchase
intentions to search (based on past research; for example, Stivastava and Lurie 2001), it is
likely to enhance their postpurchase intentions to search, given the potential for
maximization of acquisition and transaction values. These arguments lead to our first
hypothesis.
H1:

Presence of an LPG will result in lower prepurchase, but higher
postpurchase search intentions.

The Role of Consumer Characteristics
We posit that not all consumers are equally likely to respond to LPG, with regard
to their intention to search, both before and after the purchase. To the extent that
consumers differ in their value and price consciousness (Lichtenstein, Ridgway and
Netemeyer 1993), it is unlikely that all consumers seek utility maximization to the same
extent. Consequently, we posit that consumer value consciousness and price
consciousness would moderate the effect of LPG on both pre- and postpurchase search
intention.
Value consciousness has been defined as reflecting “a concern for price relative
to quality received” (Lichtenstein, Ridgway and Netemeyer 1993). In a broader sense,
consumers with a higher level of value consciousness are more concerned with the

3

It must be noted that according to our present position, an LPG is likely to cause consumers to be more
than just price attentive. Heightened postpurchase price attentiveness might result from an inherent
tendency to minimize one’s cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) but an LPG, with its potential to boost
perceptions of utility, is likely to prompt consumers to actively seek lower prices.
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acquisition value of the purchase than consumers who are less conscious of value. Thus,
value conscious consumers are more focused upon the differential between the “get”
component and the “give” component of the transaction (Zeithaml 1988), rather than just
one of these components. Costs involved with searching are likely to contribute to the
“give” component of the value equation. An LPG essentially indicates to the consumer
that further searching may be futile and may lead to increased search costs with little
incremental benefits thereby indicating a loss of value from continued search. Consumers
with higher levels of value consciousness are likely to be more concerned about adding
search costs (and thereby reducing value) and are hence more likely to respond to an LPG
than consumers with lower levels of value consciousness. Specifically, prior to purchase,
an LPG is likely to discourage search intentions more strongly for consumers with higher
levels of value consciousness.
The role of consumer value consciousness with regard to their postpurchase
search intention is based on a similar reasoning. To the extent that postpurchase search is
seen as being prospective of enhancing one’s acquisition value, consumers who are more
conscious of value are likely to be more strongly encouraged to undertake postpurchase
search under the influence of an LPG than consumers who are less conscious of value. In
sum, LPG is likely to encourage postpurchase search intention more strongly for
consumers with a higher level of value consciousness. The following hypothesis is based
on these arguments.
H2 (a): Consumer value consciousness will moderate the effects of LPG on
consumer pre- and postpurchase search intentions. The reduction
(enhancement) in consumer pre (post) purchase search intentions caused
by presence of an LPG (as opposed to its absence) is likely to be higher
for consumers with higher levels of value consciousness.
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Price consciousness has been defined as “the degree to which the consumer
focuses exclusively on paying lower prices” (Lichtenstein, Ridgway and Netemeyer
1993). It is reasonable to assume that consumers who are highly price conscious are more
likely to derive a higher level of psychological satisfaction (that is, have a higher
perception of transaction utility; Grewal, Monroe and Krishnan 1998) from paying a low
price, than consumers who are less conscious of price. Past research indicates that
presence of an LPG does enhance consumer confidence of finding low prices at the
retailing store concerned (Jain and Srivastava 2000). Therefore, it may be reasonable to
assume that an offer price associated with an LPG is indeed perceived to be low,
compared to market prices. This indicates that an LPG is likely to enhance one’s
perceptions of prepurchase transaction value thereby reducing intentions to search.
However, consumers with higher levels of price consciousness, being more concerned
with the psychological outcomes of a paid price, are more likely to be attracted to the
guaranteed low price than consumers with lower levels of price consciousness. Thus, an
LPG is likely to discourage prepurchase search intentions more strongly for consumers
with higher levels of price consciousness.
The role of consumer price consciousness with regard to their postpurchase search
intention is based on a similar reasoning. To the extent that postpurchase search (in case
of a purchase made under the assurance of an LPG) is seen as being prospective of
enhancing one’s transaction value, consumers who are more conscious of price are likely
to be more strongly encouraged to undertake postpurchase search under the influence of
an LPG than consumers who are less conscious of price.
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In sum, LPG is likely to encourage postpurchase search intention more strongly for
consumers with a higher level of price consciousness. These arguments lead to the
following hypothesis.
H2 (b): Consumer price consciousness will moderate the effects of LPG on
consumer pre- and postpurchase search intentions. The reduction
(enhancement) in consumer pre (post) purchase search intentions caused
by presence of an LPG (as opposed to its absence) is likely to be higher
for consumers with higher levels of price consciousness.
The Role of Penalty Level
The level of penalty associated with an LPG is another boundary condition for the
effects of LPG on consumer search intentions. The level of a penalty is based on the size
of the refund that is promised upon discover of a lower market price, such a refund being
usually expressed as a percentage of the difference between the two prices. Thus, an LPG
that promises to refund 100% of the difference between a guaranteed low price and a
lower marker price is of a lower level than one promising 120% of the difference.
Prior to purchase, a more stringent penalty is likely to enhance the credibility of
the signal (Boulding and Kirmani 1993; Biswas et al. 2002) and consequently might
enhance the effects of the signal. This suggests that an LPG with a higher level of penalty
is likely to lead to lower prepurchase search intention than one with a lower level of
penalty.
How is the level of penalty likely to affect consumer postpurchase search
intention? It has been argued earlier that an anticipated enhancement in perceived
acquisition and transaction values might encourage consumer intentions to search
subsequent to a purchase made under the assurance of an LPG. A refund is likely to
enhance perceived acquisition value by augmenting the total benefits received in the
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transaction and also by reducing the sacrificial component of the value equation. Also, a
refund is likely to be psychologically gratifying, given the net lower price paid for the
transaction, thereby enhancing consumer perceptions of transaction value. Owing to the
higher total benefits received from the transaction (that is, a higher “get” component),
and lower level of monetary sacrifice involved in the transaction (that is, a lower “give”
component), a larger refund is likely to lead to a higher perception of acquisition value. A
larger refund also implies a lower perceived paid price for the product4 and is hence
likely to lead to a higher level of psychological pleasure and thereby a higher level of
perceived transaction value. These arguments indicate that a higher level of penalty is
likely to favor consumer postpurchase intentions to search, given the anticipated higher
levels of acquisition and transaction utilities. These arguments lead to the following
hypothesis.
H3:

The level of penalty associated with an LPG would have an effect on preand postpurchase search intentions. An LPG associated with a higher level
of penalty leads to lower (higher) pre (post) purchase search intentions
than an LPG associated with a lower level of penalty.

Is postpurchase search likely to be enhanced equally for all consumers, with
higher levels of penalty? As is suggested by a consideration of consumers’ proneness to
maximizing value or the psychological pleasures resulting from paying a certain price, it
appears that not all consumers are equally likely to be responsive to opportunities leading
to enhancement of acquisition and transaction values. In particular, since consumers with
higher levels of value and/or price consciousness are more likely to seek opportunities to
enhance their acquisition and transaction values respectively, the effect of penalty level
4

The concept of perceived paid price is illustrated thus: supposing the consumer purchases a product at
$100 under the assurance of an LPG with a 200% refund and later discovers a price of $90 elsewhere in the
product. With the refund being $20, the perceived paid price for the product ought to be $80 ($100- $20 or
$90 - $10). Thus, the higher the refund, the lower the perceived paid price.
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on their postpurchase search intentions is likely to be stronger in their case than in the
case of consumers who are less value and/or price conscious. In other words, a higher
level of penalty encourages postpurchase search intention more strongly for consumers
with higher levels of value and/or price consciousness5. These arguments lead to the
following hypothesis.
H4 (a): In case of a purchase made under the assurance of an LPG, consumer
value consciousness will moderate the effect of penalty level on their
postpurchase search intention. The enhancement in consumer
postpurchase search intentions caused by a higher level of penalty (as
opposed to a lower level of penalty) is likely to be higher for consumers
with higher levels of value consciousness.
H4 (b): In case of a purchase made under the assurance of an LPG, consumer price
consciousness will moderate the effect of penalty level on their
postpurchase search intention. The enhancement in consumer
postpurchase search intentions caused by a higher level of penalty (as
opposed to a lower level of penalty) is likely to be higher for consumers
with higher levels of price consciousness.
Consequences of LPG Default
Overall Effects of LPG Default
Since an LPG is likely to motivate consumers to search even after the purchase,
such a search might lead them to a price lower than the paid price. In other words,
postpurchase search might lead to discovery of default of an LPG6. The present research

5

It must be noted that prior to purchase, the effect of penalty level on consumer search intentions is based
on the degree of trust that is accorded to the signal of LPG and it appears unlikely that consumers with
differential value and price consciousness would respond differentially with regard to trust enhancement
caused by a higher level of penalty. In other words, consumer value and price consciousness is not likely to
moderate the effect of penalty level on prepurchase search intention.

6

Insofar as an LPG is used as a marketing signal, any indication that the signal might be false or is at least
unreliable is cause to believe that the signal has been defaulted. Such defaulting and any consequences
thereof occur even before the retailer attempts to respond to the event by making the promised refund.
Thus, even though consumers can seek refund afterward, the very detection of a price lower than that
guaranteed constitutes a default of the implicit or explicit promise of the lowest market price and such
defaulting may reflect upon the retailer.
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attempts to investigate probable effects of LPG default on consumer perceptions of the
retailer and consumer intentions for future transactions with the retailer?
Past research indicates that default of a signal such as the LPG is associated with
costs on the part of the marketer (Kirmani and Rao 2000). In other words, the cost of
offering a low price guarantee is suffered by a retailer when such a guarantee is defaulted,
that is, when consumers later encounter prices lower than that associated with the LPG.
Although such defaulting may be reversible to a certain extent through the conditions of
penalty associated with the LPG, consumers are likely to perceive that a promise for the
lowest price has been violated. Thus, the immediate consequences of such defaulting may
be separate from consumer cognitions following retailers’ later attempts to recoup for the
default.
When a signal such as an LPG is defaulted, consumer confidence in the signal is
likely to be shaken, and any perceived adverse psychological consequences of relying on
such a signal may be attributed to the retailer’s failure to accurately inform the consumer
thereby reflecting adversely upon the retailer. What kinds of costs are likely to accrue to
the retailer? Apart from manifest monetary costs in the form of a refund, it is likely that
consumers’ overall attitude toward the retailer, their perceptions of retailer credibility and
their willingness to transact with the retailer in the future may suffer as a result of such
default. This leads us to the following hypothesis.
H5:

Consumers are (a) likely to have a less favorable attitude toward the
retailer; (b) may perceive the retailer to be less credible and (c) may
harbor lower repurchase intention when an LPG is defaulted than when it
is not.
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Boundary Conditions of Effects of LPG Default
What might be some of the boundary conditions for the impact of an LPG default
on consumer perceptions? As discussed earlier, a default in case of an LPG is represented
by consumer discovery of a discrepancy between the price paid by the consumer and a
lower price discovered elsewhere after the purchase. It is posited that the location of the
default, the size of the default, the level of penalty associated with the LPG and the time
at which the default becomes apparent to the consumer play a role in shaping the
consequences following the default of an LPG.
Default Location
As regards the location of an LPG default, the consumer might encounter a
discrepancy at the store where the purchase was made (termed as a “within-store”
default) or at a different store (termed as a “between-store” default). Are the two types of
default likely to have similar or different effects on consumer perceptions? As is
discussed subsequently, a between-store default is likely to lead to less favorable
consequences than a within-store default.
Theoretically, consumers may view LPGs in two broad ways. One way
consumers might look upon an LPG is as a genuine signaling tool. Based on such a
perspective, consumers view retailers as facing a genuine, real-life problem: “given the
naturally occurring price dispersion in the marketplace, how do I (the retailer) signal to
the consumers that mine is the lowest price?” This may be labeled as a “supportive
perception” of an LPG.
An alternative perspective on consumers’ conceptualization of an LPG is based
on the persuasion knowledge model (PKM; Friestad and Wright 1994). According to this
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model, consumers exposed to persuasive marketing communication over time develop
knowledge of such persuasion that is instrumental in shaping consumer attitudes and
behavior following such exposure. It is suggested by the model that consumers often
develop the ability to discern hidden motives behind persuasions by marketers. It is
possible that consumers view LPGs as persuasive tools whereby retailers are seen as
taking advantage of an uncertain marketplace and their knowledge of consumers’
awareness of such uncertainty. This may be labeled as an “opportunistic perception” of
LPGs. Under such a perception, consumers might tend to have some reservations with
regard to the actual motives of the retailer in offering an LPG.
Prior to a purchase, consumers might have a preponderant inclination toward a
supportive perception with the opportunistic perception residing “at the back of their
minds”, till evidences corroborating the latter perception are encountered. In other words,
prior to purchase, the consumer might harbor both supportive and opportunistic notions,
with a higher degree of salience attached to the former in terms of its use in judgment
formation. An important assumption here is that both supportive perceptions and
opportunistic perceptions of the marketplace cohabit in consumer consciousness and
consumers are generally trustful of marketplace activities until they encounter situations
or experiences to justify activation of suspicious perceptions.
When a consumer encounters a lower postpurchase price within the same store,
she might think that market prices might have taken a dip and the retailer had to keep up
with it. This is especially relevant in the light of the observation that consumers are likely
to perceive LPG offering stores as low price stores, that is, stores likely to offer low
prices (Srivastava and Lurie 2001). Hence, a within-store LPG default may be viewed as
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the result of the retailer’s effort to maintain offering low prices thereby resulting in little
or no effect on consumer perceptions of the retailer. Past empirical research indicates
some level of support for the thesis on supportive perceptions of LPGs. Biswas et al.
(2002) found that presence of an LPG favors consumer perceptions of offer value and
their intention to shop the advertiser. This appears to indicate that consumers generally
have favorable perceptions of an LPG until an occasion or experience demands
otherwise.
A consequence of these considerations appears to be that consumer perceptions of
the retailer remain unaffected when a price discrepancy (LPG default) is encountered at
the same store. In fact, to the extent that encountering a lower price at the same store
might bolster consumers’ preexisting supportive perception of an LPG, it could result in
more favorable price-related perceptions of the retailer.
A postpurchase consumer detection of price discrepancy at a store different from
the one offering the LPG, that is, a between-store LPG default might act as evidence that
corroborates or activates the hitherto concealed opportunistic perception of LPG. In other
words, detection of a lower price at a different store might strengthen consumer suspicion
that the retailer had taken an advantage of the existing market price dispersion,
consumers’ natural tendencies to minimize search costs and their limited market
knowledge. Furthermore, a between-store default might lead the consumer to suspect that
the LPG was not based on sound and careful market knowledge. It appears to be quite
probable that such consumer suspicion would reflect unfavorably upon the retailer.
Consequently, it is likely that a between-store LPG default will lead to less favorable
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perceptions about the retailer than a within-store LPG default. This leads us to propose
the following hypothesis.
H6:

A postpurchase between-store LPG default will lead to (a) less favorable
consumer attitude toward the retailer; (b) lower levels of perceived retailer
credibility and (c) lower levels of repurchase intentions than a within-store
LPG default.

Default Size
The size of an LPG default is simply the algebraic difference between the paid
price and the encountered lower price. What effect might LPG default size have on
consumer perceptions of the retailer? We posit that default size has a main effect on
postpurchase consumer perceptions of the retailer and also moderates the effect of default
location on consumer perceptions of the retailer. Specifically, a larger default leads to
less favorable perceptions than a smaller default and also the adverse effects of a
between-store default are stronger in case of a larger default. These effects of default size
are discussed subsequently.
As stated above, the size of an LPG default is simply the algebraic difference
between the paid price and the encountered lower price. Such a discrepancy may be
viewed by the consumer as a loss thereby adversely affecting her overall perceptions of
utility involved in the purchase. The value function for loss is a negatively sloping steep
curve for low to moderate levels of loss and flattens out for higher levels of loss (Thaler
1985). This indicates that within reasonable limits of the LPG default size, a larger
default is likely to lead to lower perceptions of value. An expression of this perceived
loss of utility might take the form of less favorable perceptions of the retailer. In other
words, consumers might attribute the loss of utility, at least partially, to retailer’s inability
to emit a reliable signal. Apart from considerations based on perceived loss of utility,
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default size is likely to directly affect consumer perceptions based on the premise of
signaling theory. LPG fundamentally acts as a signal of market knowledge on the part of
the retailer and retailer credibility, among other things. A larger default more seriously
calls into question any trust placed by the consumer on the signal. Since the retailer is
seen to consciously originate such a signal, consequences of any perceived failure of the
signal would naturally reflect upon the retailer. In sum, the disparaging effects of a larger
default operate in two modes: through a larger perceived loss in utility and also through a
stronger blow on consumer faith and confidence in the signal in question. Relatively
smaller defaults might be deemed as somewhat “healthy”, and might be attributed to
normal marketplace uncertainties, and hence might not trigger such an acute sense of loss
as to cast any doubt over the retailer’s image. However, considerably larger defaults
might lead to an acute sense of loss in utility and loss of confidence in the signal and
thereby to attribute the same to retailer inability to emit a reliable signal thus disfavoring
consumer perceptions of the retailer. In sum, consumer perceptions of the retailer are
likely to be less favorable with increasing default size. This leads us to the following
hypothesis on the main effects of default size.
H7:

Default size affects consumer postpurchase perceptions of the retailer. A
larger the default leads to (a) less favorable overall attitude toward the
retailer; (b) lower levels of perceived retailer credibility and (c) lower
repurchase intentions.

According to our earlier arguments, both supportive and opportunistic notions of
LPG cohabit in consumer consciousness and a between-store default can potentially
activate the latter perceptions. It is possible that for extremely small defaults, such
activation does not occur at all. Even if a small between-store default activates
opportunistic notions, the perceived loss of utility might not be large enough to affect
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consumer perceptions of the retailer by a large extent. Thus, a small between-store
default (compared to a small within-store default) is not likely to adversely affect
consumer perceptions by a large extent. However, when default is larger, the less
favorable consumer perceptions in case of a between-store default results from two
sources: a sizeable perception of loss in utility and a reinforcement of the activated
opportunistic notion of the retailer’s LPG. In contrast, the less favorable consumer
perceptions from a large within-store default results from a perceived loss of utility only.
This indicates that the adverse effects of a between-store default (compared to a withinstore default) on consumer perceptions are likely to be stronger for larger defaults. It
must be noted that consumer perception of a signal as being imperfect is conceptually
distinct from their perception that the signal might have been used opportunistically,
specifically in terms of intensities of their consequences with regard to consumer
perceptions. One might be led to attribute less confidence to a signal simply because the
retailer is seen to be incompletely and imperfectly informed of the market or because the
market itself is turbulent. To believe that the retailer is given to opportunistic
implementation of a signal is quite a different perspective and might lead to more serious
consequences. It is the compounding of both perspectives that lead to substantially less
favorable perceptions in case of a larger between-store default. These arguments lead to
the following hypothesis on the interaction between default location and default size.
H8:

Default size moderates the effect of default location on consumer
perceptions of the retailer. A between-store default (compared to a withinstore default) leads to significantly (a) less favorable consumer attitude
toward the retailer; (b) lower levels of perceived retailer credibility and (c)
lower levels of repurchase intention when default is large than when it is
small.
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Default Time
Default time is defined as the period of time that elapses between the purchase
and the detection of the LPG default. Is it likely that the length of the time that elapses
between the purchase and the detection of the default affects consumers’ postpurchase
perceptions? For instance, is detecting an LPG default on the second day of purchase
likely to lead to similar effects on consumer perceptions than detecting a default on the
twentieth day of purchase? If default is detected shortly after the purchase, consumer
confidence in the signal (that is, the LPG) may be called into question thereby leading the
consumer to cast the retailer in an unfavorable light. However, the economics of
information theory (Stigler 1961) suggests that consumers are likely to be aware of the
uncertain nature of the market, especially with regard to price dispersion. It is likely that
a default that is detected further downstream from the purchase, that is, after a longer
period of time, might be attributed (at least partially) to market turbulence and
uncertainties. Furthermore, the psychological impact of a perceived loss in utility may
diminish as the detection of the loss is further downstream from the focal event (in this
case, the purchase) to which the loss is related. In other words, the longer the time period
between the purchase and detection of the LPG default, the less intense the psychological
impact of the perceived loss. A fundamental rationale behind this position is that since
the benefits of the purchased product had been accruing to the consumer during the time
period separating the purchase and detection of the default (that is, the default time),
perceived acquisition utility should have been accumulating and hence a default detected
at a later point in time may be received with less psychological discomfort than a default
that immediately follows the purchase. Some support for this position is derived from
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recent empirical research indicating that individuals more easily absorb the psychological
impact of sunk costs with longer passages of time (Gourville and Soman 1998). These
arguments imply that a default that is temporally proximal to the purchase leads to less
favorable consumer perceptions than one that is temporally distal to the purchase. This
leads us to the following hypothesis.
H9:

A default that is temporally proximal to the purchase leads to (a) less
favorable consumer attitude toward the retailer; (b) lower levels of
perceived retailer credibility and (c) lower levels of repurchase intention
than a default that is temporally distal.

We further posit that default time will influence the interaction between default
location and default size proposed earlier (see H8). Specifically, we suggest that the
intensity of interaction between default location and default size, stated in H8 earlier, will
diminish as the default becomes temporally distal.
In order to understand how default time affects the interaction between default
location and default size, it might be helpful to recall the driving mechanism behind the
posited interaction. Earlier, we proposed that when the default is small, a between-store
default is likely to lead to comparable levels of consumer perceptions for within-store and
between-store defaults either because a small between-store default does not activate an
opportunistic notion of LPG or because even if such activation occurs, the consumer is
not very confident of the validity of such notion. We also proposed that a large default
helps to reinforce the opportunistic notion activated by a between-store default thereby
leading considerably less favorable perceptions in case of a large between-store default
(compared to a large within-store default). In other words, a larger default aggravates the
unfavorable effect of a between-store default, owing to a reinforcement of the activated
opportunistic notion. We posit that such an interaction is more likely to occur when the
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default is temporally proximal to the purchase, that is, when default time is small. The
immediacy of the default does neither allow room for psychological assimilation of the
perceived loss in utility (resulting from a large default) nor does it justify consumer
attribution of the between-store default to normal marketplace fluctuations thereby
allowing the interaction between default location and default size.
When the default is temporally distal, consumer perceptions are still comparable
between a small between-store and a small within-store default because the opportunistic
notion of LPG has barely been activated. However, a distal default allows the consumer
to psychologically assimilate the increased perception of loss in utility resulting from a
larger default and also allows the consumer to rationalize that the detected lower price
might be attributable to marketplace uncertainties, thereby making the consumer less
certain of the activated opportunistic notion of LPG resulting from a large between-store
default. Thus, when the default is temporally distal, a large default fails to reinforce the
opportunistic notion activated by a between-store default or does so with less strength
than when the default is temporally proximal, thereby reducing the disparity in consumer
perceptions between a large between-store default and a large within-store default. In
sum, although a distal default obviates the unfavorable effects of a large between-store
default (compared to a large within-store default), it has no such effect in case of small
within-store and small between-store defaults, given the comparable levels of consumer
perceptions in the latter situations. Consequently, the interaction between default location
and default size is likely to be weaker, and is likely to disappear in the extreme, when the
default is temporally distal. The following hypothesis is based on these arguments.
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H10:

There will be a three-way interaction between default location, default size
and default time with regard to postpurchase consumer perceptions of the
retailer. When the default is temporally proximal to the purchase, default
location and default size will interact such that the adverse effects of a
between-store default on (a) consumer overall attitude toward the retailer,
(b) perceived retailer credibility and (c) repurchase intention will be
stronger for a larger default. When the default is temporally distal to the
purchase, the interaction between default location and default size will be
significantly weaker, diminishing in the extreme.

In the following chapter, we describe the methodology and results of an
experiment conducted to test hypotheses H1 through H4.
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY ONE
A study (hereafter referred to as “Study One”) was conducted to test hypotheses
H1 through H4 and was primarily concerned with LPG’s effects on consumer
postpurchase search intention. In this chapter, we discuss details of the methodology
adopted in Study One and report the results of data analyses.
Methodology
A 3 x 2 x 2 between-subjects experimental design was used for Study One. The
experiment involved three conditions related to an LPG (an LPG absent condition; an
LPG present condition with the refund equaling 100% of the difference between the offer
price and a lower price; and an LPG present condition with the refund equaling 150% of
the difference between the offer price and a lower price), two levels of consumer value
consciousness (High and Low) and two levels of consumer price consciousness (High
and Low). The conditions related to LPG were manipulated through print ads designed to
emulate newspaper-based ads from local retailers. Also, the penalty levels adopted for the
study were comparable to those used in prior research (Biswas et al. 2002) and were also
consistent with those used in the local market. Both consumer value consciousness and
price consciousness were measured and the items for each of the measures were adapted
from Lichtenstein, Ridgway and Netemeyer (1993). Values obtained for items of these
scales were summated across the items and the summed scores were subjected to median
split for the purpose of creating two levels (high and low) of each of the constructs.
Appendixes A, B and C contain specimens of the experimental stimuli used to conduct
the study (Appendix A contains a specimen of the complete stimulus including the
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questionnaire used to measure relevant variables; Appendixes B and C contain other
stimuli used for purposes of LPG manipulation).
Two hundred and seventy-six undergraduate students from the college of business
of a large southern state university were used as subjects for the experiment. The subjects
were randomly distributed across the three LPG-related conditions (LPG absent; LPG
with 100% penalty level; LPG with 150% penalty level). Each subject was first exposed
to a mock-up print ad of a palm pilot (PDA), similar in style and design to print ads from
local retailers. After viewing the ad, each subject responded to a series of questions
related to various issues (please refer to Appendix A, B and C for details). Among these
measures were sets of items that attempted to measure subjects’ intentions to search prior
to purchase. These items were borrowed from Biswas et al. (2002) and are based on
established scales. After responding to questions related to prepurchase consumer
cognitions and knowledge, subjects were exposed to a filler task where several brand
marks were provided and subjects were required to identify the brands associated with
the logos to the best of their knowledge and abilities. The filler task was deemed
necessary for three reasons: in order to minimize monotony; in order to create a virtual
sense of passage of time between exposure to the ad and response to it; in order to
prevent hypothesis guessing on the parts of the subjects.
After completing the filler task, subjects were provided with a brief scenario
where they were asked to imagine that they had purchased the advertised PDA and that
they were satisfied with its performance. The clause related to satisfactory performance
of the PDA was necessary in order to forestall possible confounds. In order to ensure that
any postpurchase intention to search was caused by a desire to enhance utility and not by
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any reason (such as minimizing cognitive dissonance through postpurchase brand
comparisons), it was deemed necessary to stipulate that performance related factors were
not likely to prompt searching. Furthermore, consumers might take recourse to other
alternatives (such as returning the item to the store, by invoking standard store return
policies) in case of poor product performance thereby truncating motivations to search for
better prices. Thus, it was deemed necessary to explicitly state a performance related
clause, in order to avoid confounding motivations to undertake postpurchase search.
After reading the purchase scenario, subjects responded to several questions
related to their postpurchase cognitions, including items related to intentions to undertake
effortless and effortful search and those related to the two trait-based constructs, value
consciousness and price consciousness. Next, we present details of results obtained from
the experiment described above.
Study One Results
The first study was conducted in order to test hypotheses H1 through H4 that
addressed the effects of LPG on consumer prepurchase and postpurchase search
intentions. The present chapter reports the results from Study One and is organized as
follows. First, we provide details of manipulation checks. Second, we provide reliabilities
(Cronbach alpha) of the scales that are directly relevant to the hypotheses; that is,
prepurchase search intention, postpurchase search intention, value consciousness and
price consciousness. Third, we discuss the procedure followed in dichotomizing the scale
measures of value and price consciousness. Fourth, we report results of testing each of
the four hypotheses. Finally, we provide a summary of the obtained results.
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Manipulation Checks
It might be recalled that three conditions related to presence or absence of an LPG
were created with two levels of penalty (100% refund and 150% refund) for the LPG
present conditions and a third level where subjects were not exposed an LPG (henceforth
referred to as the “LPG absent” condition). Consequently, subjects responded to two
manipulation check questions, one where they were asked if the advertisement they had
been exposed to contained an LPG and another where they were asked about the level of
refund that was promised in the advertisement with “No refund” being one of the options.
For further discussions, we would refer to the former as the LPG manipulation check”
and the latter as the “refund manipulation check”. Analyses revealed that 85 out of 96
subjects (that is, 88.54%) in the 100% LPG condition qualified both the manipulation
checks; 84 out of 96 respondents (that is, 87.5%) in the 150% LPG condition qualified
both the manipulation checks; 71 out of 84 subjects (that is, 88.1%) in the LPG absent
condition qualified both the manipulation checks. After eliminating subjects who failed to
qualify either or both of the manipulation checks the sample size was reduced to 240
respondents.
Reliability Analyses
Prepurchase search intention was measured using three items on 7-point Likert
type scales. The Cronbach alpha for this scale was 0.93. Postpurchase search intention
was measured using the same three items as the prepurchase measures, with suitable
modification for relevance to the postpurchase setting. The Cronbach Alpha for the
postpurchase search intention scale was 0.95. Both value consciousness and price
consciousness were measured using scales borrowed from Lichtenstein, Ridgeway and
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Netemeyer (1993). Item scores for the 7-item value consciousness scale had a Cronbach
alpha of 0.80 and the 5-point price consciousness scale had a Cronbach alpha of 0.87.
The reliability levels of scores for the four scales referred to above were deemed to be
satisfactory following the criteria suggested by Nunnally (1978), and hence these scales
were used for further analyses. For a listing of the items used for each scale, please refer
to Appendix A.
Dichotomizing Value and Price Consciousness
In view of the fact that hypothesis testing would require the use of ANOVA with
value consciousness and price consciousness as factors, it was necessary to dichotomize
these measures. Consequently, each of these measures was dichotomized with respect to
their median values, 5.54 for value consciousness and 3.00 for price consciousness. Two
levels of value consciousness were created with the lower level having a mean of 4.63
and the higher level having a mean of 6.19. Each of the levels of value consciousness had
120 respondents in them and the difference between the means of the two levels was
statistically significant (t=20.97; p<0.00).
Similarly, two levels of price consciousness were created the mean for the lower
level being 4.24 and that for the higher level being 2.157. 116 respondents belonged to the
lower level of price consciousness and 124 respondents belonged to the higher level and
the difference between the means of the two levels was statistically significant (t=22.12;
p<0.00).

7

Since all but one of the items on the price consciousness scale were reverse coded, the unique item was
recoded such that a lower score on the summated price consciousness scale implied a higher level of
price consciousness and higher score implied a lower level of price consciousness.
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Preliminary Analyses
Four ANOVAs were conducted to test the overall effects of LPG, value
consciousness and price consciousness on subjects’ prepurchase and postpurchase search
intention. Most of our hypotheses proposed effects of presence of an LPG in comparison
to its absence. Consequently, for the purposes of the preliminary analyses, as also for the
purposes of subsequent hypotheses testing, subjects belonging to the two penalty
conditions of LPG were pooled to create a single “LPG present” condition with the other
existing condition being the absence of LPG (that is, the “LPG absent” condition).
First, a 2 (LPG present; LPG absent) x 2 (value consciousness: low and high)
ANOVA was conducted with respect to prepurchase search intention followed by a 2
(LPG present; LPG absent) x 2 (value consciousness: low and high) ANOVA with
respect to postpurchase search intention. The results of these analyses are presented in
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.
Table 4.1
The Effect of LPG (2 levels) and Value Consciousness (2 levels) on Prepurchase
Search Intention
Sources
Main Effects

df

F-value (p-value)

LPG

1

14.74 (0.00)

Value Consciousness

1

19.81 (0.00)

1

0.72 (0.40)

Interaction
LPG*Value
Consciousness

236

Residual

61

As shown in Table 4.1, the interaction between LPG and value consciousness
with respect to their effects on prepurchase search intention was statistically nonsignificant (F=0.72; p<0.40). However, the main effect of LPG was significant (F=14.74;
p<0.00). These results would be referred to subsequently for specific testing of
hypotheses H1 and H2 (a).
Table 4.2
The Effect of LPG (2 levels: LPG Present; LPG Absent) and Value Consciousness (2
levels) on Postpurchase Search Intention
Sources
Main Effects

df

F-value (p-value)

LPG

1

9.08 (0.00)

Value Consciousness

1

2.83 (0.09)

1

17.24 (0.00)

Interaction
LPG*Value
Consciousness
Residual

236

As shown in Table 4.2, the interaction between LPG and value consciousness
with respect to their effects on postpurchase search intention was statistically significant
(F=17.24; p<0.00). Also, the main effect of LPG was significant (F=14.74; p<0.00).
These results would be referred to subsequently for specific testing of hypotheses H1 and
H2 (a).
Next, a 2 (LPG present; LPG absent) x 2 (price consciousness: low and high)
ANOVA was conducted with respect to prepurchase search intention followed by a 2
(LPG present; LPG absent) x 2 (price consciousness: low and high) ANOVA with respect
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to postpurchase search intention. The results of these analyses are presented in Tables 4.3
and 4.4 respectively.
Table 4.3
The Effect of LPG (2 levels) and Price Consciousness (2 levels) on Prepurchase
Search Intention
Sources
Main Effects

df

F-value (p-value)

LPG

1

11.24 (0.00)

1

8.06 (0.01)

1

0.35 (0.55)

Price Consciousness
Interaction
LPG*Price
Consciousness

236

Residual

Table 4.4
The Effect of LPG (2 levels) and Price Consciousness (2 levels) on Postpurchase
Search Intention
Sources

df

F-value (p-value)

1

8.11 (0.01)

1

1.66 (0.20)

1

3.21 (0.07)

Main Effects
LPG
Price
Consciousness
Interaction
LPG*Price
Consciousness
Residual

236

As shown in Table 4.3 above, the interaction between LPG and price
consciousness with respect to their effects of prepurchase search intention was
statistically non- significant (F=0.35; p<0.55). However, the main effect of LPG was
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significant (F=11.24; p<0.00). These results would be referred to subsequently for
specific testing of hypotheses H1 and H2 (a).
As shown in Table 4.4 above, the interaction between LPG and price
consciousness with respect to their effects of postpurchase search intention was
marginally significant (F=3.21; p<0.07). Also, the main effect of LPG was significant
(F=8.11; p<0.01). These results would be referred to subsequently for specific testing of
hypotheses H1 and H2 (a).
In sum, presence of an LPG was seen to have an effect on consumer prepurchase
and postpurchase search intention. Specifically, exposure to an LPG lowered consumers’
prepurchase search but raised their postpurchase search intention. However, the effect of
Low Price Guarantee on subjects’ prepurchase search intention was not moderated by
either their value or price consciousness whereas these individual characteristics
moderated the effect of Low Price Guarantee on consumers’ postpurchase search
intention. With these findings, specific analyses were performed to test the hypotheses.

Hypotheses Tests
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis stated that exposure to an LPG disfavors consumers’
intention to search prior to a purchase but encourages their intention to search after the
purchase. For the purpose of testing H1, subjects in the two levels of penalty associated
with the LPG conditions were pooled to create two conditions of LPG: LPG present and
LPG absent.
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The effect of LPG on prepurchase search intention was found to be statistically
significant (t=-3.45; p<0.00) with average prepurchase search in the LPG present
condition being significantly lower (mean=5.51) than that in the LPG absent condition
(mean=6.16), thereby lending support to the first part of H1. Thus, in corroboration with
findings from previous research, it was found that prior to purchase, consumers were less
likely to search for better deals when they were exposed to an LPG.

A second t-test, conducted to test the effect of LPG on postpurchase search
intention was found to be statistically significant (t=2.85; p<0.01) with average
prepurchase search in the LPG present condition being significantly higher (mean=4.40)
than that in the LPG absent condition (mean=3.74), thereby lending support to the second
part of H1. Thus, the present findings indicate that consumers’ postpurchase search
intention is likely to be higher when a purchase is made under the promise of an LPG.
Overall, the tests described above lent strong support to H1.

Hypothesis 2
H2 (a) stated that the proposed effect of LPG on consumer prepurchase and
postpurchase search intention is likely to be stronger for consumers with higher levels of
value consciousness. For the purpose of testing H2 (a), subjects in the two levels of
penalty associated with the LPG conditions were pooled to create two conditions of LPG:
LPG present and LPG absent. The means and results of specific univariate contrasts that
are relevant to the testing of H2 (a) are presented in Table 4.5 below.
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Table 4.5
Univariate Contrasts on Prepurchase and Postpurchase Search Intention for Low
and High Value Consciousness

Prepurchase
Search
Intention
Postpurchase
Search
Intention

Value
Consciousness

Present

LPG*
Absent

Low
High

5.02
5.97

5.86
6.51

t-value (pvalue)
-3.23 (0.00)
-3.33 (0.00)

Low
High

3.74
5.01

3.99
3.45

-0.88 (0.38)
4.70 (0.00)

*Mean for each type of search intention is reported for each level of value consciousness.
As shown in Table 4.1 presented earlier, the interaction between LPG and value
consciousness with respect to their effects on prepurchase search intention was
statistically non-significant (F=0.72; p<0.40). As shown in the upper half of Table 4.5
above, the level of prepurchase search intention was significantly lower (t=-3.23 p<0.00)
in the presence of an LPG (mean=5.02) than in its absence (mean=5.86) when value
consciousness was low. Similarly, the level of prepurchase search intention was
significantly lower (t=-3.33; p<0.00) in the presence of an LPG (mean=5.97) than in its
absence (mean=6.51) when value consciousness was high. These results indicated that
LPG is likely to discourage prepurchase search intention, regardless of the level of
consumer value consciousness.
As shown in Table 4.2 presented earlier, the interaction between LPG and value
consciousness with respect to their effects on consumer postpurchase search intention
was statistically significant (F=17.24; p<0.00). The interaction is graphically represented
by the means plot in Figure 4.1 below.
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Figure 4.1. Effect of LPG and Value Consciousness on Postpurchase Search
Intention
As shown in the lower half of Table 4.5 above, although the level of postpurchase
search intention for low value conscious subjects was slightly higher in the absence of an
LPG (mean=3.99) than in its presence (mean=3.74), this difference between the means
was non-significant (t=-0.88; p<0.38). In contrast, and as predicted by H2 (a), the level of
postpurchase search intention for subjects with a high level of value consciousness was
higher in the presence of an LPG (mean=5.01) than in its absence (mean=3.45) and this
difference in means was statistically significant (t=4.70; p<0.00) thereby lending support
to H2 (a).
H2 (b) stated that the proposed effect of LPG on consumer prepurchase and
postpurchase search intention is likely to be stronger for consumers with higher levels of
price consciousness. For the purpose of testing H2 (b), subjects in the two levels of
penalty associated with the LPG conditions were pooled to create two conditions of LPG:
LPG present and LPG absent. The results of specific univariate contrasts that are relevant
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to the testing of H2 (b) and the means associated with such testing are presented in Table
4.6 below.
Table 4.6
Univariate Contrasts on Prepurchase and Postpurchase Search Intention for
Low and High Price Consciousness

Prepurchase
Search
Intention

LPG*

Price
Consciousness

Present

Absent

t-value (pvalue)

Low

5.19

5.92

-2.62
(0.01)

High

5.83

6.34
-2.72
(0.01)

Postpurchase
Search
Intention

Low

4.05

3.81

0.75 (0.46)

High

4.75

3.69

3.31 (0.00)

*Mean for each type of search intention is reported for each level of price consciousness.
As shown in Table 4.3 presented earlier, the interaction between LPG and price
consciousness with respect to their effects on subjects’ prepurchase search intention was
statistically non-significant (F=0.35; p<0.55). The reason for this non-significant
interaction effect is clearly seen from Table 4.6 above.
As shown in the upper half of Table 4.6, the level of prepurchase search intention
was significantly lower (t=-2.62; p<0.01) in the presence of an LPG (mean=5.19) than in
its absence (mean=5.92) for low price consciousness. Also, the level of prepurchase
search intention was significantly lower (t=-2.72; p<0.01) in the presence of an LPG
(mean=5.83) than in its absence (mean=6.34) for high price consciousness. These results
indicated that LPG is likely to discourage prepurchase search intention, regardless of the
level of consumer price consciousness.
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As shown in Table 4.4 presented earlier, the interaction between LPG and price
consciousness with respect to their effects on consumer postpurchase search intention
was marginally significant (F=3.21; p<0.07). This interaction is graphically represented
in Figure 4.2 below. The nature of the interaction predicted in H2 (b) requires
investigation of specific contrasts and these discussed next.
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Figure 4.2. Effect of LPG and Price Consciousness on Postpurchase Search
Intention
As shown in the lower half of Table 4.6 above, although subjects’ postpurchase
search intention was slightly higher in the presence of an LPG (mean=4.05) than in its
absence (mean=3.81) when price consciousness was low, this difference was not
statistically significant (t=0.75; p<0.46). In contrast, and as predicted by H2 (b), the level
of postpurchase search intention in the presence of an LPG was higher (mean=4.75) than
in its absence (mean=3.69) when price consciousness was high and this difference was
statistically significant (t=3.31; p<0.00). These findings lend support to H2 (b).
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Hypothesis 3
H3 predicted that an LPG associated with a higher level of penalty would lead to
lower prepurchase search intention but higher postpurchase search intention than an LPG
with a lower level of penalty. Results of univariate contrasts between the two levels of
penalty with respect to subjects’ prepurchase and postpurchase search intention are
presented in Table 4.7 below.
Table 4.7
Univariate Contrasts between LPG Penalty Levels for Prepurchase and
Postpurchase Search Intention
LPG with
150% refund*

LPG with 100%
refund*

t-value (pvalue)

Prepurchase Search
Intention

5.36

5.66

-1.48 (0.14)

Postpurchase Search
Intention

4.67

4.13

2.17 (0.03)

*Mean for each type of search intention is reported for each level of LPG penalty.
As shown in Table 4.7 above, the level of prepurchase search intention for
subjects exposed to the 150% penalty level was lower (mean=5.36) than subjects exposed
to the 100% penalty level (mean=5.66) but this difference was not statistically significant
(t=-1.48; p<0.14). However, the level of postpurchase search intention for subjects
exposed to the 150% penalty level was higher (mean=4.67) than subjects exposed to the
100% penalty level (mean=4.13) and this difference was statistically significant (t=2.17;
p<0.03).
In order to investigate whether associating a specific level of penalty with an LPG
influenced subjects’ prepurchase and postpurchase search intention in comparison to the
control condition marked by the absence of an LPG, several univariate contrasts were
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conducted. The results of contrasts related to prepurchase and postpurchase search
intention are presented in Table 4.8 below.
Table 4.8
Univariate Contrasts between LPG Penalty Levels and the Control Condition for
Prepurchase and Postpurchase Search Intention
Search Intention

Prepurchase
Postpurchase

LPG Present
150%
100%
Refund* Refund*

5.36
4.67

5.66
4.13

LPG
Absent*

6.16
3.74

t-value (p-value)
LPG with LPG with
150%
100%
refund
Refund
Vs.
Vs.
LPG
LPG
Absent
Absent
3.75 (0.00) 2.34 (0.02)
3.56 (0.00) 1.50 (0.14)

*Mean for each type of search intention is reported for each level of LPG penalty and the
control condition.
As shown in Table 4.8 above, providing an LPG is likely to attenuate prepurchase
search intention, regardless of the level of penalty. Furthermore, providing a 150% refund
with an LPG significantly enhances consumers’ postpurchase search intention in
comparison to the control condition of providing no LPG (t=3.56; p<0.00). However,
providing a 100% refund with an LPG does not significantly alter consumers’
postpurchase search intention in comparison to the control condition of providing no
LPG. These findings clearly indicate the stronger effect on prepurchase and postpurchase
search intention with higher levels of penalty thereby lending support to H3.
Hypothesis 4
H4 (a) predicted that the effect of an LPG’s penalty level on consumers’
postpurchase search intention would be stronger with higher levels of consumer value
consciousness. A 2 (LPG with 100% refund; LPG with 150% refund) x 2 (value
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consciousness: low and high) ANOVA was conducted to test this hypothesis. The results
of the ANOVA are presented in Table 4.9 below.
Table 4.9
The Effect of LPG Penalty Levels (2 levels) and Value Consciousness
(2 levels) on Postpurchase Search Intention
Sources
Main Effects

df

F-value (p-value)

LPG Penalty Levels

1

1.93 (0.17)

Value Consciousness

1

25.11 (0.00)

1

0.58 (0.45)

Interaction
LPG Penalty Levels *Value
Consciousness

165
Residual
As shown in Table 4.9 above, the interaction between LPG penalty levels and
value consciousness with respect to their effects on subjects’ postpurchase search
intention was statistically non-significant (F=0.58; p<0.45). Univariate contrasts were
conducted to further investigate the nature of these effects and the results of these
contrasts are presented in Table 4.10 below.
Table 4.10
Univariate Contrasts between LPG Penalty Levels on Postpurchase Search
Intention for Low and High Value Consciousness

Low Value
Consciousness
High Value
Consciousness

LPG with
150% refund*

LPG with
100% refund*

t-value (p-value)

3.83

3.68

0.48 (0.64)

5.23

4.71

1.45 (0.15)

*Mean is reported for each level of LPG penalty.
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As shown in Table 4.10 above, a higher level of penalty did not lead to
significantly higher levels of postpurchase search intention for either low value
consciousness or high value consciousness consumers.
H4 (b) predicted that the effect of an LPG’s penalty level on consumers’
postpurchase search intention would be stronger with higher levels of consumer price
consciousness. A 2 (LPG with 100% refund; LPG with 150% refund) x 2 (price
consciousness: low and high) ANOVA was conducted to test this hypothesis. The results
of the ANOVA are presented in Table 4.11 below.
Table 4.11
The Effect of LPG Penalty Levels (2 levels) and Price Consciousness (2 levels) on
Postpurchase Search Intention
Sources
Main Effects

df

F-value (p-value)

LPG Penalty Levels

1

3.24 (0.07)

Price Consciousness

1

6.48 (0.01)

1

0.188 (0.67)

Interaction
LPG Penalty Levels *Price
Consciousness

165

Residual

As shown in Table 4.11 above, the interaction between LPG penalty levels and
price consciousness with respect to their effects on subjects’ postpurchase search
intention was statistically non-significant (F=0.188; p<0.67). Univariate contrasts were
conducted to further investigate the nature of these effects and the results of these
contrasts are presented in Table 4.12 below.

73

Table 4.12
Univariate Contrasts between LPG Penalty Levels on Postpurchase Search
Intention for Low and High Price Consciousness
LPG with
150% refund*

LPG with 100%
refund*

t-value (p-value)

4.24

3.90

1.02 (0.31)

5.00

4.43

1.50 (0.14)

Low Price Consciousness
High Price Consciousness

*Mean is reported for each level of LPG penalty.
As shown in Table 4.12 above, the difference in the level of postpurchase search
intention between the two penalty conditions was statistically non-significant for subjects
with a lower level of price consciousness (t=1.02; p< 0.31) and also for subjects with a
higher level of price consciousness (t=1.50; p<0.14) thereby failing to support H4 (b).
Summary of Results of Hypotheses Tests
The results of Study One are summarized in Table 4.13 below. Implications of
these findings are discussed in the following chapter.
Table 4.13
Summary of Results of Hypotheses Tests
Hypothesis
H1:

Presence of an LPG will result in lower prepurchase, but
higher postpurchase search intentions

H2 (a): Consumer value consciousness will moderate the effects
of LPG on consumer pre- and postpurchase search
intentions. The reduction (enhancement) in consumer pre
(post) purchase search intentions caused by presence of an
LPG (as opposed to its absence) is likely to be higher for
consumers with higher levels of value consciousness.
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Nature of
Support
Supported

Not supported for
prepurchase
search intention
Supported for
postpurchase
search intention

Table 4.13 (Continued)
Hypothesis
H2 (b): Consumer price consciousness will moderate the
effects of LPG on consumer pre- and postpurchase
search intentions. The reduction (enhancement) in
consumer pre (post) purchase search intentions caused
by presence of an LPG (as opposed to its absence) is
likely to be higher for consumers with higher levels of
price consciousness.
H3: The level of penalty associated with an LPG would have
an effect on pre- and postpurchase search intentions. An
LPG associated with a higher level of penalty leads to
lower (higher) pre (post) purchase search intentions than
an LPG associated with a lower level of penalty.

H4 (a): In case of a purchase made under the assurance of an
LPG, consumer value consciousness will moderate
the effect of penalty level on their postpurchase
search intention. The enhancement in consumer
postpurchase search intentions caused by a higher
level of penalty (as opposed to a lower level of
penalty) is likely to be higher for consumers with
higher levels of value consciousness.
H4 (b): In case of a purchase made under the assurance of an
LPG, consumer price consciousness will moderate
the effect of penalty level on their postpurchase
search intention. The enhancement in consumer
postpurchase search intentions caused by a higher
level of penalty (as opposed to a lower level of
penalty) is likely to be higher for consumers with
higher levels of price consciousness.

Nature of Statistical
Support
Not supported for
prepurchase search
intention
Supported for
postpurchase search
intention
Not supported for
prepurchase search
intention
Supported for
postpurchase search
intention
Not supported

Not supported

In the following chapter, we discuss the methodology and results of a second
experiment conducted to test the proposed effects of LPG default.
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CHAPTER 5: STUDY TWO
A second experiment was conducted to test hypotheses H5 through H10 and this
experiment was primarily concerned with the effects of LPG default on consumer
cognitions and affect related to the retailer in question. In this chapter, first we discuss
details of the methodology adopted in Study Two. Next, we report results of data
analyses. Finally, we discuss the findings of this study.
Pretests
Before conducting the main experiment, we conducted two pretests, one with the
purpose of selecting a product and the other with the purpose of determining what might
be deemed by subjects to be “high” and “low” default with respect to a given purchase
price. In the product selection pretest, 41 undergraduate students were asked to report
their level of familiarity with two products, digital camera and laptop computer, on a 5point scale (1= “Not familiar at all”; 5= “Highly familiar”). The mean level of familiarity
with laptop computer was 4.0 on the familiarity scale and the difference of this mean
from the scale median was significant (t=9.06; p<0.00). The mean level of familiarity
with digital camera was 2.85; however, this mean was not significantly different from the
mid-point of the scale (t=0.85; p<0.40); that is, subjects were indifferent with regard to
their familiarity with digital cameras. The digital camera was chosen as the product for
the final study because subjects were neither too familiar nor too unfamiliar with this
product. The rationale for such a choice was that a highly unfamiliar product might not
trigger enough interest in the stimulus related to the product and a highly familiar product
might trigger excessive thoughts about realism of the manipulation.
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Conditions related to low price guarantees are applicable to individual models of
products. Thus, consumers can claim refunds only if they can demonstrate that the same
model they purchased from a retailer can be bought at a lower price in the market. In
order to select a particular model for the study, information was gathered from the
website www.cnet.com and also the local retail market was studied. One of the conditions
for selecting a model was that the model be available with multiple retailers in the local
market and also that the model had a sizeable price variation in the local market. Based
on these considerations, the model chosen for the product was SONY DSC-P52 and the
price set for the model was $279.99. This price was deemed to be reasonable as a
probable purchase price for digital cameras for students.
A second pretest was conducted in order to determine what might be deemed as
low and high levels of default with respect to the price of $279.99 chosen for the model
of digital camera in question. Appendix D contains the stimuli used for this pretest. In the
stimulus, subjects were asked to imagine that they had purchased a digital camera for
$279.99 under the assurance of an LPG and were then asked to report what they would
consider to be “somewhat lower” and “substantially lower” prices, should they come
across lower price for this model after purchase. The degree to which subjects were likely
to return to the store for a refund was also reported by them on 7-point scales (1=
“Extremely Unlikely”; 7= “Extremely Likely”), for each of the two prices they reported.
Finally, subjects were asked to report the upper limit of a lower price found after
purchase in the market for which they were willing to return to the store for a refund.
Thirty-three undergraduate students participated in the pretest and the means and
standard deviations obtained from the pretest are presented in Table 5.1 below.
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Table 5.1
Means from Pretest
Measure
A price deemed to be somewhat lower
than the purchase price of $279.99
A price deemed to be substantially
lower than the purchase price of
$279.99
The upper limit of the price for which
refund will be sought
Likelihood of seeking refund for
reported “somewhat lower price”
Likelihood of seeking refund for
reported “substantially lower price”

Mean
$264.11

Standard Deviation
$9.39

$233.18

$19.58

$245.00

$22.54

3.85

1.87

6.15

0.24

Based on these results, the lower default size was chosen as $15 (that is, the lower
price detected after purchase would be $264.99) and the higher default size chosen was
$56 (that is, the lower price detected after purchase would be $223.99)8.
Main Study
A 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects experimental design was used for Study Two. The
experiment involved two conditions related to default location (within store default--when lower price was detected at the store that purchase was made from; between store
default when lower price was detected at a store other than the one the purchase was
made from); two levels of default size (low default---in which case consumers detected a
price that was $15 less than they had paid; high default--- in which case consumers
detected a price that was $56 less than they had paid) and two levels of default time
(proximal default---in which case postpurchase detection of lower price occurred 2 days

8

This was done in order to strengthen the manipulation. It may be noted that the mean reported for a
somewhat lower price was significantly different from he mean reported for an upper limit of a price that
would trigger refund seeking (t=5.10; p<0.00) and also the likelihood of seeking refund in case of detecting
the reported somewhat lower price was not statistically significant from the scale median of 4 (t=0.47;
p<0.65).
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after purchase; distal default---in which case postpurchase detection of lower price
occurred 25 days after purchase). Besides these three factors related to LPG default, a
control condition was created where subjects made the purchase under the assurance of
an LPG but they did not come across a lower price within 30 days of the purchase (that
is, a “no default” condition).
Two hundred and sixty-eight undergraduate students from the college of business
of a large southern state university were used as subjects for the experiment. The nine
sets of stimulus used for the experiment are presented in Appendices E through M. Two
hundred and twenty-eight students were exposed to the default scenarios and 40 students
responded to the control condition. Subjects were first asked to read a brief description of
an electronic store that was mentioned to have several outlets in the south and
southeastern United States. They were also told that they would shortly see an ad from
this store. The store was given a fictitious store name (Ziggy Electronics) and subjects
were told that the real name of the store had been suppressed. The store description
matched those of the typical electronic outlets in existence in the local market and was
provided to primarily create a baseline attitude toward the retailer. Subjects were asked to
imagine that they lived in the city where the store was located. Next, subjects were
exposed to an advertisement of the SONY DSC-P52 model of digital camera from this
store. The phrase “Low Price Guarantee” appeared across the top of the ad and conditions
related to the price guarantee were written at the bottom of the ad. Conditions related to
the price guarantee were similar to those prevalent in the local at the time of the
experiment. After viewing the ad, subjects answered a few questions related to the ad the
stated conditions of the accompanying price guarantee. The primary purpose of these
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questions were to enforce deeper processing of the ad the price guarantee such that
subjects retained his information even after further manipulations related to LPG default.
Next, in the LPG default conditions, subjects read a scenario where they were asked to
imagine that they purchased the advertised camera and after a few days (specifically
stated depending on the level of default time being manipulated) they either found the
same model to be sold at a lower price (specifically stated depending on the level of
default size being manipulated) at the same store they purchased from or at a different
store. In the control condition, subjects were asked to imagine that they did not find the
camera to be undersold within the stipulated time frame (that is, 30 days) of the low price
guarantee. Subjects next responded to several measures related to the three dependent
constructs of perceived credibility of the retailer, attitude toward the retailer and
repurchase intention. Retailer credibility was measured with five items on semantic
differential scales, based on the credibility measure of Lichtenstein and Bearden (1989).
Attitude toward retailer was measured with three items on semantic differential scales,
based on past measures of attitude toward a brand or an ad. Repurchase intention was
measured with three items on 7-point scales. Finally, subjects responded to several
manipulation check and demographic questions. For a listing of the items used for the
various scales, please refer to Appendices E and F.
Manipulation Checks
In the experimental conditions, subjects responded to three manipulation check
questions, one for each default condition, and an additional manipulation check question
where they were asked if they made the purchase under a low price guarantee. Out of a
total of 228 respondents who were exposed to scenarios involving default, 216 (94.7%)
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respondents passed the manipulation check on default location; 221 (96.9%) respondents
passed the manipulation check on default size and 220 (96.5%) respondents passed the
manipulation check on default time. Overall, 204 (89.5%) respondents passed
manipulation check on all of the three default conditions. Only eight respondents (3.5%)
missed the manipulation check on LPG and seven of them had qualified all of the
manipulation checks related to LPG default. Thus, 197 respondents qualified both
default-related manipulation checks and LPG-related manipulation checks and were
finally included for analyses involving the default-related experimental conditions. Table
5.2 depicts the final cell sizes for the eight experimental conditions.
Table 5.2
Cell Sizes for Respondents finally Included for Analyses involving Default-Related
Experimental Conditions
Distal Default

Proximal
Default

Between-Store
Default
Within-Store
Default
Between-Store
Default
Within-Store
Default
Total

High Default
21

Low Default
29

Total
50

29

22

51

20

29

49

20

27

47

90

107

197

Reliability Analyses
Multi-item scales for the three dependent variables of interest, perceived retailer
credibility, attitude toward retailer and repurchase intention were subjected to reliability
analyses. Cronbach alpha for the 5-item scale for perceived retailer credibility was .96;
Cronbach alpha for the 3-item scale for attitude toward retailer was .97 and Cronbach
alpha for the 3-item scale for repurchase intention was .96. Items across each scale were
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summated and scale averages were used for further analyses. For a listing of the items
used for the various scales, please refer to Appendixes E and F.

Preliminary Analyses
Prior to testing for specific hypotheses involving the boundary conditions of
default of a low price guarantee, we tested for hypothesis 5 in order to ascertain that
default of a price guarantee does lead to less favorable perceptions of the retailer
compared to when a price guarantee is not defaulted and we also conducted a full
factorial MANOVA and individual ANOVAs to ascertain overall effects of the default
conditions on consumer perceptions of the retailer. Results of these analyses are
discussed next. In reporting results of our analyses, p-values of one-tailed tests are
reported for all tests involving specific mean comparisons.

Hypothesis 5 stated that consumers are likely to harbor less favorable perceptions
of the retailer when they detect a lower market price for a product they had purchased
under a low price guarantee. We tested for this hypothesis in two ways: first, we pooled
respondents across the eight experimental conditions and through independent samples ttests compared their perceptions with respondents in the control condition; second, we
compared retailer perceptions from each experimental cell with those in the control
condition using similar tests. Table 5.3 depicts the results of these analyses.
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Table 5.3
Comparison of Consumer Perceptions of Retailer between Experimental and
Control Conditions
Perceived Retailer
Credibility
Means
1

2

t-value

EC

CC

(p-value)

Pooled across
default
conditions

4.68

6.16

Between storehigh defaultproximal default

3.75

Within storehigh defaultproximal default

Means

Repurchase Intention

t-value

CC

(p-value)

8.99 (.00) 4.95

6.14

6.16

10.12
(.00)

4.21

5.22

6.16

Between storehigh defaultdistal default

4.20

Within storehigh defaultdistal default
Between storelow defaultproximal default

t-value
CC

(p-value)

7.05 (.00) 4.84

6.30

9.01 (.00)

6.14

7.32 (.00) 3.85

6.30

7.65 (.00)

3.79 (.00) 5.43

6.14

2.93 (.01) 5.43

6.30

3.61 (.00)

6.16

7.12 (.00) 4.25

6.14

6.35 (.00) 4.08

6.30

6.01 (.00)

4.63

6.16

4.89 (.00) 4.91

6.14

3.92 (.00) 5.17

6.30

5.09 (.00)

4.65

6.16

5.20 (.00) 4.80

6.14

4.09 (.00) 4.68

6.30

5.35 (.00)

Within store-low 4.44
defaultproximal default

6.16

5.10 (.00) 4.89

6.14

3.68 (.00) 4.57

6.30

5.52 (.00)

5.12

6.16

3.77 (.00) 5.20

6.14

3.40 (.00) 5.18

6.30

3.99 (.00)

Within store-low 5.32
default-distal
default

6.16

3.58 (.00) 5.83

6.14

1.35 (.09) 5.61

6.30

3.05 (.00)

Between storelow defaultdistal default

1

2

Attitude Toward
Retailer
EC

Experimental Condition
Control Condition

83

EC

As is seen from Table 5.3 above, default of a low price guarantee leads to
significantly lower perceptions of retailer credibility, significantly less favorable attitude
toward the retailer and significantly lower repurchase intention, irrespective of the
specific conditions related to the default. This provides strong support for hypothesis 5.
Prior to testing for specific hypotheses involving probable boundary conditions of
an LPG default, some preliminary tests were conducted. The correlations among the three
dependent variables of interest are reported in Table 5.4 below.

Table 5.4
Correlation among the Dependent Variables
Perceived retailer
credibility
Perceived retailer
credibility
Attitude toward
retailer
Repurchase
intention

Attitude toward
retailer

.85 (.00)*
.76 (.00)

.81 (.00)

*p-value is reported in the parentheses.
In view of the high correlation among the dependent variables, a full-factorial
MANOVA was conducted along with associated univariate tests and the results are
reported in Table 5.5 below.
As is seen from Table 5.5, the multivariate interaction effect between the three
default conditions is non-significant (Wilks’ Lambda=.98; F=1.21; p<.31). Further, the
multivariate interaction effect between default location and default size is significant
(Wilks’ Lambda=.93; F=4.85; p<.00) and is attributable to perceived retailer credibility
(F=6.36; p<.01) and repurchase intention (F=9.41; p<.00).
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Table 5.5
Results of full-factorial MANOVA and ANOVAs
Sources

MANOVA
Perceived
Retailer
Credibility
F
(p-value)

ANOVA
Attitude
Repurchase
Toward
Intention
Retailer
F
F
(p-value)
(p-value)

df

Wilks’
Lambda

Effect
Size

F (p-value)

.92

.08

5.31 (.02)

6.23
(.01)

10.71
(.00)

15.10
(.00)

1

.97

.04

2.00 (.12)

5.20
(.02)

5.82
(.02)

3.74
(.06)

1

.97

.03

1.70 (.17)

2.56
(.11)

1.16
(.28)

3.80
(.05)

1

.93

.06

4.85 (.00)

6.36
(.01)

2.11
(.15)

9.41
(.00)

1

DL x DT

.99

.03

.83 (.48)

.71
(.40)

.00
(.99)

.01
(.93)

1

DS x DT

.97

.02

1.81 (.15)

3.81
(.05)

5.24
(.02)

4.42
(.04)

1

DL x DS x
DT
Error df
Total df

.98

.02

1.21 (.31)

3.57
(.06)
188
196

1.20
(.16)
188
196

1.71
(.19)
188
196

1

Main
Effects
Default
Location
(DL)
Default Size
(DS)
Default
Time (DT)
Interaction
Effects
DL x DS

186
196

The multivariate main effect of default location is significant (Wilks’
Lambda=.92; F=5.31; p<.02) and is attributable to perceived retailer credibility (F=6.23;
p<.01), attitude toward retailer (F=10.71; p<.00) and repurchase intention (F=15.10;
p<.00). The multivariate main effect of default size is non-significant (Wilks’
Lambda=.97; F=2.00; p<.12). Finally, the multivariate main effect of default time is nonsignificant (Wilks’ Lambda=.97; F=1.70; p<.17). In the next section, we discuss specific
tests relevant to our hypotheses related to the boundary conditions of LPG default effects.
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Since the three-way multivariate and univariate interaction effects were non-significant,
the relevant two-way interactions would be focused upon in discussing hypotheses
testing. Also, detailed analyses revealed that two-way interactions involving the default
conditions were not disordinal (detailed discussions of interactions involving these
variables would be presented in the next section) and hence main effects of these factors
would be considered.
Tests of Hypotheses Related to Conditions of LPG Default
Hypothesis 6 stated that a postpurchase between-store default leads to lower
perceived retailer credibility, less favorable attitude toward the retailer, and lower levels
of consumer repurchase intention than does a within-store default. As is seen from the
results of the full-factorial ANOVA in Table 5.5, the effect of default location on
perceived retailer credibility is significant (F=6.23; p<.01); also, this effect is due to the
lower level of perceived retailer credibility in the between-store condition (Pooled
Mbetween-store=4.51; pooled Mwithin-store=4.86). Table 5.5 shows the effect of default location
on attitude toward retailer to be significant (F=10.71; p<.00) and is due to a less favorable
attitude toward the retailer in case of a between-store LPG default (Pooled Mbetweenstore=4.69;

pooled Mwithin-store=5.22). Finally, Table 5.5 shows the effect of default location

on consumer repurchase intention to be significant (F=15.10; p<.00) and is due to lower
levels of repurchase intention in case of a between-store default (Pooled Mbetweenstore=4.53;

pooled Mwithin-store=5.16). These results indicate support for hypothesis 6.

Hypothesis 7 stated that a larger LPG default leads to lower perceived retailer
credibility, less favorable attitude toward the retailer and lower levels of consumer
repurchase intention. As is seen from the results of the full-factorial ANOVA in Table
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5.5, the effect of default size on perceived retailer credibility is significant (F=5.20;
p<.02); also, this effect is due to the lower level of perceived retailer credibility in case of
a larger default (Pooled Mlarge default=4.19; pooled Msmall default=4.60). Table 5.5 shows the
effect of default size on attitude toward retailer to be significant (F=5.82; p<.02) and is
due to a less favorable attitude toward the retailer in case of a large LPG default (Pooled
Mlarge default=4.43; pooled Msmall default=4.87). Finally, Table 5.5 shows the effect of default
size on consumer repurchase intention to be significant (F=3.74; p<.05) and is due to
lower levels of repurchase intention in case of a large default (Pooled Mlarge default=4.39;
pooled Msmall default=4.71). These results indicate support for hypothesis 7.
Hypothesis 8 predicted that default size would moderate the effects of default
location on postpurchase consumer perceptions of the retailer such that the effects of
default location are stronger for a larger default. As is seen from Table 5.5 presented
earlier, the interaction effect of default location is significant with respect to perceived
retailer credibility (F=6.36; p<.01) and repurchase intention (F=9.41; p<.00) but not with
respect to attitude toward the retailer (F=2.11; p<.15). Testing of hypothesis 8 involves
specific mean comparisons and these results appear in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6
Results of Specific Mean Comparisons for Default Location x Default Size
Interaction Effects
Dependent
Variable
Perceived Retailer
Credibility
Attitude Toward
Retailer
Repurchase
Intention

Small Default
Large Default
Between Within
t-value
Between Within
t-value
Store
Store
(p-value)
Store
Store (p-value)
4.89
4.84
.19 (.43)
3.98
4.87
3.34 (.00)
5.00

5.31

1.12 (.13)

4.23

5.12

3.15 (.00)

4.93

5.03

.38 (.35)

3.97

5.28

4.85 (.00)
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As is seen from Table 5.6, the effects of default location on perceived retailer
credibility, attitude toward the retailer, and repurchase intention are not significant (t=.19,
p<.43; t=1.12, p<.13; t=.38, p<.35; respectively) when default is small. However, the
effects of default location on perceived retailer credibility, attitude toward the retailer,
and repurchase intention are significant (t=3.34, p<.00; t=3.15, p<.00; t=4.85, p<.00;
respectively) when default is large. The results are graphically presented below in Figures
5.1(a), 5.1(b) and 5.1(c). These results provide strong support for hypothesis 8.

Perceived Retailer
Credibility

t=.19
(p<.43)

t=3.34;
(p<.00)
Within-store
default
Betweenstore
default

Means = 4.89;
4.84

Means = 4.87;
3.98

Small
Default

Large
Default

Figure 5.1 (a): Default Location x Default Size Interaction with Respect to Perceived
Retailer Credibility
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t=1.12
(p<.26)

t=3.15;
(p<.00)

Attitude toward
Retailer

Within-store
default
Betweenstore
default

Means = 5.31;
5.00

Means = 5.12;
4.23

Small
Default

Large
Default

Figure 5.1 (b): Default Location x Default Size Interaction with Respect to Attitude
toward Retailer
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t=.38
(p<.71)

t=4.85
(p<.00)

Repurchase
Intention

Within-store
default
Betweenstore
default

Means = 5.03;
4.93

Means = 5.28;
3.97

Small
Default

Large
Default

Figure 5.1 (c): Default Location x Default Size Interaction with respect to
prepurchase Intention
Hypothesis 9 predicted that consumer postpurchase perceptions of the retailer
would be less favorable in case of a proximal default than in case of a distal default. As is
seen from Table 5.5 presented earlier, while the effect of default time on repurchase
intention is significant (F=3.99; p<.05), those on perceived retailer credibility and attitude
toward retailer are non-significant (F=2.59, p<.11; F=1.16, p<.28; respectively). Thus,
hypothesis H9 was partially supported.
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Hypothesis 10 predicted that default location, default size and default time would
interact such that the interaction between default location and default size proposed in
hypothesis 8 would be stronger in case of a proximal default. As is seen from Table 5.5
presented earlier, the proposed three-way interaction is marginally significant for
perceived retailer credibility (F=3.61; p<.06) but is non-significant for attitude toward
retailer (F=2.00; p<.16) and repurchase intention (F=1.82; p<.18). Further testing for
hypothesis 10 was carried out by inspecting the interaction between default location and
default size for each level of default time using factorial ANOVAs. The results of these
analyses are presented in Table 5.7 below.

Table 5.7
Default Location (DL) x Default Size (DS) Interaction for Each Level of Default
Time
Dependent
Variable

Perceived
Retailer
Credibility
Attitude
Toward
Retailer
Repurchase
Intention

Distal Default
Fvalue
(DL)

pvalue

Fvalue
(DS)

pvalue

1.43

.23

9.38

5.81

.02

9.05

.00

Proximal Default
pvalue

Fvalue
(DL)

pvalue

Fvalue
(DS)

pvalue

.00

Fvalue
(DL x
DS)
.21

p-value

.082

Fvalue
(DL x
DS)
9.51

.65

5.44

.02

.05

12.11

.00

.00

.98

4.95

.03

.01

.93

3.75

.06

9.32

.00

1.77

.19

6.73

.01

.00

.95

8.89

.00

As is seen from table 5.7, the interaction between default location and default size
is non-significant with respect to perceived retailer credibility (F=.21; p<.65), attitude
toward the retailer (F=.00; p<.98), and repurchase intention (F=1.77; p<.19) in case of
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.00

distal default, but is significant with respect to these dependent variables in case of a
proximal default (F=9.51, p<.00; F=3.75; p<.06; F=8.89; p<.00 for the three dependent
variables respectively) indicating support for hypothesis 10.

Table 5.8 (a)
Means for Default Location x Default Size Interaction for Distal Default
Dependent Variable
Perceived Retailer
Credibility
Attitude Toward Retailer
Repurchase Intention

Distal Default
Small Default
Large Default
Between
Within
Between
Within
Store
Store
Store
Store
5.12
5.32
4.20
4.64
5.20
5.18

5.83
5.61

4.25
4.08

4.91
5.17

Table 5.8 (b)
Means for Default Location x Default Size Interaction for Proximal Default
Dependent Variable
Perceived Retailer
Credibility
Attitude Toward Retailer
Repurchase Intention

Proximal Default
Small Default
Large Default
Between
Within
Between
Within
Store
Store
Store
Store
4.65
4.44
3.75
5.22
4.81
4.68

4.89
4.57

4.21
3.85

5.43
5.43

Tables 5.8(a) and 5.8(b) report the means associated with the two-way interaction
between default location and default size for each level of default time and figures 5.3,
5.4 and 5.5 illustrate the nature of the two-way interaction for each level of default time.
As would be seen from these figures, for the most part a large default aggravates the
effect of a between-store default only when the default is proximal.
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Perceived Retailer Credibility

Within-Store

Means =
5.32; 5.12

t = .59;
p < .56

Small
Default

BetweenStore

Within-Store

Means =
4.65; 4.44

Means =
4.64; 4.20

BetweenStore
Means =
5.22; 3.75

t = 1.06;
p < .29

t = .51;
p < .61

Large
Default

Small
Default

Distal Default

t = 4.76;
p < .01

Large
Default

Proximal Default

Figure 5.3: Default Location (DL) x Default Size (DS) Interaction with respect to
Perceived Retailer Credibility for Each Level of Default Time
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Attitude Toward Retailer

Within-Store
Default
Within-Store
Default
Means =
5.83; 5.20
t = 1.98;
p < .06

BetweenStore Default

BetweenStore Default
Means =
4.89; 4.81
t = .20;
p < .85

Means =
4.91; 4.25

t = 3.66;
p < .01

t = 1.52;
p < .14

Small
Default

Means =
5.43; 4.21

Large
Default

Small
Default

Distal Default

Large
Default

Proximal Default

Figure 5.4: Default Location x Default Size Interaction with respect to Attitude toward
Retailer for Each Level of Default Time
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Repurchase Intention

Within-Store
Default

BetweenStore
Default

Means =
5.61; 5.18
t = 1.24;
p < .22

Within-Store
Default

Means =
4.68; 4.57
Between-Store
Default

t = .28;
p < .78

Means =
5.43; 3.85
t = 4.25;
p < .01

Means =
5.17; 4.08
t = 2.75;
p < .01
Small
Default

Large
Default

Small
Default

Distal Default

Large
Default

Proximal Default

Figure 5.5: Default Location x Default Size Interaction with respect to Repurchase
Intention for Each Level of Default Time
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Summary of Results of Hypotheses Tests
The results of Study Two are summarized in Table 5.9 below. A discussion of
these findings is presented subsequently.

Table 5.9
Summary of Results of Hypotheses Tests
Hypothesis

Nature of
Statistical
Support
Supported

H5:

Consumers are (a) likely to have a less favorable attitude
toward the retailer; (b) lower level of perceived retailer
credibility and (c) may harbor lower repurchase intention
when an LPG is defaulted than when it is not.

H6:

A postpurchase between-store LPG default will lead to (a)
less favorable consumer attitude toward the retailer; (b)
lower levels of perceived retailer credibility and (c) lower
levels of repurchase intentions than a within-store LPG
default.

Supported

H7:

Default size affects consumer postpurchase perceptions of
the retailer. A larger the default leads to (a) less favorable
overall attitude toward the retailer; (b) lower levels of
perceived retailer credibility and (c) lower repurchase
intentions.

Supported

H8: Default size moderates the effect of default location on
Supported
consumer perceptions of the retailer. A between-store
default (compared to a within-store default) leads to
significantly (a) less favorable consumer attitude toward the
retailer; (b) lower levels of perceived retailer credibility and
(c) lower levels of repurchase intention when default is large
than when it is small.
H9:

A default that is temporally proximal to the purchase leads
to (a) less favorable consumer attitude toward the retailer;
(b) lower levels of perceived retailer credibility and (c)
lower levels of repurchase intention than a default that is
temporally distal.
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Supported only
for Repurchase
Intention

Table 5.9 (Continued)
Hypothesis
H10: There will be a three-way interaction between default
location, default size and default time with regard to
postpurchase consumer perceptions of the retailer.
When the default is temporally proximal to the
purchase, default location and default size will interact
such that the adverse effects of a between-store default
on (a) consumer overall attitude toward the retailer, (b)
perceived retailer credibility and (c) repurchase
intention will be stronger for a larger default. When the
default is temporally distal to the purchase, the
interaction between default location and default size
will be significantly weaker, diminishing in the
extreme.

Nature of Support
Supported

Post Hoc Analysis
Our results indicate a significant interaction between default size and default time
with respect to each of the dependent variables (please see Table 5.5 presented earlier).
Such interactions were not predicted and deserve post hoc analysis. As is seen from Table
5.5, the interaction effect of default size and default time is significant with respect to
perceived retailer credibility (F=3.81; p<.05), attitude toward retailer (F=5.24; p<.02) and
repurchase intention (F=4.42; p<.04). Table 5.10 reports the results of comparison of
means related to these interaction effects and figures 5.6 (a), 5.6 (b) and 5.6 (c)
graphically illustrate these effects.
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TABLE 5.10
Mean Comparisons for Default Size x Default Time Interactions
Dependent Variable

Distal Default
Small
Large
t-value
Default Default (p-value)
5.21
4.45
2.92 (.00)

Perceived Retailer
Credibility
Attitude Toward
Retailer
Repurchase
Intention

Proximal Default
Small
Large
t-value
Default Default (p-value)
4.55
4.49
.23 (.82)

5.47

4.63

3.10 (.00)

4.85

4.84

.03 (.98)

5.37

4.71

2.51 (.01)

4.63

4.64

.06 (.96)

t=2.92
(p<.00)

t=.23
(p<.82)

Perceived Retailer
Credibility

Small
Default

Large
Default

Means =
4.55; 4.49

Means =
5.21; 4.45

Distal
Default

Proximal
Default

Figure 5.6 (a): Default Size x Default Time Interaction with Respect to Perceived
Retailer Credibility
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t=3.10
(p<.00)

t=.03
(p<.98)

Attitude Toward
Retailer

Small
Default

Large
Default

Means =
5.47; 4.63

Means =
4.85; 4.84

Distal
Default

Proximal
Default

Figure 5.6 (b): Default Size x Default Time Interaction with Respect to Attitude
toward Retailer
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t=.06
(p<.96)

t=2.51
(p<.01)

Repurchase
Intention

Small
Default
Large
Default

Means =
5.37; 4.71

Means =
4.64; 4.63

Distal
Default

Proximal
Default

Figure 5.6 (c): Default Size x Default Time Interaction with Respect to Repurchase
Intention

As is seen from the table and the figures above, default size negatively affects
consumer perceptions of the transacting retailer only when the default is distal but not
when the default is proximal. The effect of a proximal default is instantaneous and strong
and even a small default might not be attributable to marketplace fluctuations thereby
leading to similar effects as a large default; the effect of a distal default, on the other
hand, is somewhat attributable to marketplace fluctuations only when the default is small
(price fluctuations within a certain range might be plausible) but not when the default is
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large. It must also be noted from the figures that the nature of these interactions masks
the main effect of default time for two of the dependent variables.
In the following chapter, we discuss the results obtained from studies one and two
followed by a discussion of the theoretical and managerial contribution of the present
research. Finally, we note some limitations of our approach and suggest areas for future
research.
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CHAPTER 6: GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we first discuss results obtained from studies one and two. Then
we discuss the theoretical and managerial contributions of the present research, the
limitations of our approach and possible areas for future research. The sections are
organized accordingly.
Discussion of Results from Study One
Past research on consumer perceptions of Low Price Guarantees focused on the
effect of LPG on consumer prepurchase cognitions such as their search intention, their
propensity to patronize a retailer, and other related issues. Following an argumentation
that justifies investigation of postpurchase implications of LPG (Arbatskaya; working
paper), the present research primarily proposed to investigate whether purchase made
under the promise of an LPG is likely to enhance postpurchase consumer search intention
(compared to the situation where a purchase is made without such a price-related
assurance) and also to investigate possible implications of an LPG default. The first of
these two major propositions was tested through an empirical study, the results of which
are discussed below.
As proposed, it was found that offering an LPG discourages consumer intention to
search prior to a purchase. This finding corroborates past similar findings (Biswas et al.
2002; Jain and Srivastava 2000; Srivastava and Lurie 2001) and reinforces an important
benefit of LPG to retailers. Results of study one also indicated that a purchase made
under the promise of an LPG is likely to encourage consumer search intention following
a purchase. The present findings indicated that consumers who made a purchase under
the assurance of an LPG are more likely to continue searching even after the purchase,
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for reasons based on utility maximization. This may be concluded from the fact that the
scenario in study one used to manipulate postpurchase consumer cognitions emphasized
that the consumer was satisfied with the made purchase thereby obviating other probable
reasons for searching and ensuring that any searching undertaken is likely to stem from a
desire to enhance utilities rather than to minimize cognitive dissonance.
Certain boundary conditions were proposed for the effects of LPG on consumer
prepurchase and postpurchase search intention. We did not find support for our
proposition that consumers who are more conscious of value are more likely to be
responsive to an LPG prior to a purchase. Specifically, we found that an LPG
discouraged consumer prepurchase search intention regardless of the level of their value
consciousness. Similarly, we found that an LPG discouraged consumer prepurchase
search intention regardless of the level of their price consciousness. A large part of the
mechanism through which an LPG operates on consumer responses relies on the
credibility of the low price claim (Biswas et al. 2002). Since there is no reason to assume
that consumers of varying levels of value consciousness or price consciousness would
also vary on the level of their trust in the marketplace, it appears that the credibility of a
low price claim is comparable across levels of consumer value or price consciousness,
thereby generating similar responses for consumers who vary on these characteristics.
Contrary to our finding with regard to prepurchase search intention, and in
consonance with our prediction, we found that an LPG encourages postpurchase search
intention more strongly for consumers who are highly conscious of value and for
consumers who are highly conscious of price. This finding lends indirect support to the
theoretical consideration that predicted these outcomes. Specifically, we had predicted
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that an LPG offers consumers an opportunity to enhance their utilities while avoiding the
pitfall of enhancing cognitive dissonance through postpurchase detection of a lower price.
Since consumers varying in their levels of value consciousness or price consciousness are
not likely to vary in terms of their desire to avoid cognitive dissonance, the only viable
reason for the observed stronger effect of LPG on postpurchase search intention is
attributable to variation based on desire to enhance utilities.
With regard to the prepurchase effects of penalty levels associated with an LPG,
our findings indicate that when one strictly compares the effect of one penalty level with
another, there is likely to be no difference in their effects on prepurchase consumer
search intention. This is somewhat surprising in light of the argument that a marketplace
signal (such as an LPG) primarily operates through a mechanism that relies on consumer
perceptions of the credibility of such a signal (Kirmani and Rao 2000). To that extent, a
higher level of penalty ought to lend enhanced credibility to an LPG prior to a purchase
and should therefore discourage search intention more strongly. It must be noted,
however, that although our finding with regard to prepurchase effect of penalty levels
was not statistically significant, the observed means were in the predicted direction. As
shown in Table 4.7, subjects indicated a lower level of prepurchase search intention when
a refund of 150% was promised (mean=5.36) than when a 100% refund was promised
(mean=5.66). Furthermore, even though there was no statistically significant difference in
effects of the penalty levels, our findings indicate that offering an LPG discourages
prepurchase search intention, in comparison to the baseline condition of not offering a
price guarantee at all, and such an effect of LPG occurs regardless of the level of penalty
employed.
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In contrast to our findings regarding prepurchase effects of penalty levels, and as
predicted, we found that a higher level of penalty is more likely to encourage
postpurchase consumer search intention compared to a lower level of penalty. However,
while a higher level of penalty encourages postpurchase search intention compared to the
baseline condition of absence of an LPG, a lower level of penalty, specifically, one that
promises to refund just the difference between a paid price and a lower market price, does
not seem to offer consumers with a viable reason to enhance postpurchase search
compared to when an LPG is not offered, perhaps because locating a lower-priced retailer
is monetarily equivalent to purchasing from this retailer in the first place.
Finally, we did not find statistical support for our prediction that the positive
effect of a higher level of penalty on postpurchase consumer search intention is likely to
be stronger for consumers having higher levels of value consciousness or for consumers
having higher levels of price consciousness. Perhaps, the utility enhancing possibility
offered by a higher level of penalty (through postpurchase searching) is uniformly
appreciated by consumers, regardless of their value or price consciousness. However, as
would be seen from Tables 4.10 and 4.12 presented earlier, the direction of observed
means was as predicted. Thus, a higher level of penalty was seen to encourage
postpurchase search intention for higher value conscious subjects by a larger extent
(mean difference on postpurchase search intention between the two penalty levels was
0.52) than for subjects who are less value conscious (mean difference on postpurchase
search intention between the two penalty levels was 0.15). Similarly, a higher level of
penalty was seen to encourage postpurchase search intention for higher price conscious
subjects by a larger extent (mean difference on postpurchase search intention between the
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two penalty levels was 0.57) than for subjects who are less price conscious (mean
difference on postpurchase search intention between the two penalty levels was 0.34).
These observations indicate some support for our arguments that consumers’ value
consciousness and price consciousness tend to enhance the positive effect of a higher
penalty level on postpurchase consumer search intention.
The following chapter reports details of procedure and results of a second
experiment conducted to test hypotheses related to consequences of LPG default.
Discussion of Results from Study Two
In the present day marketplace, retailers frequently offer low price guarantees
(LPG) on a wide range of products. As part of such guarantees, consumers are assured
that they are paying the lowest price on the product being purchased and should
consumers be able to detect lower prices in the market, the retailers would refund an
amount that equal or exceed the price difference. Price fluctuations are becoming
increasingly common in today’s marketplace and such fluctuations increase the
probability of consumer detection of lower prices, a situation we have conceptualized as a
“default” of the price guarantee. Past research (e.g., Biswas et al. 2002), indicates that
given obvious constraints on consumer ability to exhaustively search the market prior to
any purchase, consumers respond to price guarantees somewhat on trust and take the
price guarantee somewhat at face value. In the present research we have argued that
consumer detection of lower prices than that paid under the assurance of an LPG
constitutes a “default” of the low price signal (akin to default of a quality signal whence a
product fails to perform satisfactorily despite the marketer’s signals of a high quality;
Kirmani and Rao 2000) and that consumers experiencing such default are likely to have
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less favorable perceptions of the transacting retailer than those who do not experience a
default. We further argued that the impact of such default on consumer cognitions related
to the retailer would depend on several factors associated with the default, namely, the
location of the default (whether the lower price was detected at the same store where
purchase was made ---a within-store default --- or whether the lower price was detected at
a different store---a between-store default); the size of the default (defined as the
difference of the paid price and the detected lower price) and the time of the default
(defined by the period of time of that elapses between purchase and detection of the
lower price). An experiment was conducted to test our hypotheses on probable consumer
outcomes of LPG default and results of the experiment are discussed in this section.
We found that despite retailer promise of a refund following detection of lower
price consumers who experience an LPG default have less favorable perceptions of the
transacting retailer after a default than consumers who do not experience a default.
Specifically, we found that consumers who experience an LPG default perceive the
retailer to be less credible, have less favorable attitude toward the retailer and harbor
lower levels of repurchase intention than consumers whose posturchase experiences
continue to make them believe that the price they paid was the lowest market price.
Furthermore, our results show that negative consumer outcomes of default occur
regardless of the conditions associated with the default; whether the default occurs within
the store of purchase or at a different store, whether it is a small or a large default,
whether it occurs immediately after purchase or after sometime, default creates its
unfavorable impact on consumers. Perhaps, consumers experiencing a default feel that
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their trust in the low price signal was misplaced and such a feeling is expressed through
reporting of less favorable perceptions of the transacting retailer.
With the understanding that default does lead to unfavorable consumer outcomes,
we sought to investigate whether various conditions associated with a default lead to
variations in the observed cognitive effects of LPG default. Consistent with our
prediction, we found that a between-store default leads to lower perception of retailer
credibility, less favorable attitude toward the retailer and lower intention to transact with
the retailer in the future than does a within-store default. It might be recalled that our first
experiment had demonstrated a higher propensity for postpurchase price search for
consumers who purchase under the assurance of an LPG thereby indicating that even
though consumers might take an LPG somewhat at its face value, they do not altogether
discount the possibility that such a guarantee might be issued by retailers under imperfect
market information, intentionally or otherwise. In other words, even though consumers’
initial response to an LPG indicates a supportive notion of the pricing tool, their
postpurchase intended response points to the possibility of a concurrent suspicion of
opportunistic implementation of an LPG. It is possible that a between-store default lends
some degree of confirmation to this suspicion of opportunistic implementation of LPGs
and aggravates the feeling of betrayal consequent upon detection of a default. A withinstore default, in contrast, is at least partially attributable to marketplace price fluctuations
and the retailer’s response to them through further price reduction; however, since even a
within-store default (see results of testing hypothesis 5 presented earlier) was seen to lead
to less favorable perceptions of the retailer compared to a postpurchase experience free of
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default, it follows that attribution to marketplace price fluctuations does not entirely
mitigate the feeling of betrayal consequent upon a within-store default.
Our finding also shows that larger the difference between a paid price and a lower
market price (detected after a purchase was made under the assurance of an LPG),
stronger is the negative effect of default on consumer perceptions of the transacting
retailer. Specifically, consumers perceive the retailer to be less credible, have less
favorable attitude toward the retailer and have lower levels of repurchase intention when
default was larger. It appears that a larger default makes consumers feel more strongly
about the betrayal of their trust thereby leading them to report less favorable perceptions
of the retailer.
The effect of default location on consumer postpurchase perceptions of the
retailer depends on the size of the default. Specifically, the unfavorable effect of a
between-store default (compared to a within-store default) was seen to occur only when
the default was large. It appears that consumer suspicion of an opportunistic
implementation of LPG, triggered and confirmed by a between-store LPG default, occurs
only when the default crosses a threshold size. Such suspicion does not seem to be
activated by small defaults. Perhaps, a small default is attributed to marketplace
fluctuations that the retailer needs some time to respond to.
Finally, our findings show that time does also play a role in reducing the
aggravating effect of default size on the activation of an opportunistic perception of LPG
that likely results from a between-store default. Specifically, we found that a larger
default aggravates the negative effects of a between-store default on consumer perceived
retailer credibility, their attitude toward the retailer and their repurchase intention more
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strongly when the default occurs within a relatively shorter time of the purchase. With a
default further downstream from the purchase, consumers get an opportunity to attribute
the default to marketplace price fluctuations thereby reducing the aggravating impact of
default size on negative consequences of a between-store default. In sum, in line with
previous research on probable effects of time on consumer postpurchase cognitions, we
found that time does tend to reduce the intensity of negative impact related to an
exchange as one moves further downstream from the exchange (Soman and Gourville
1998).
Theoretical Contribution
Low price guarantees are becoming increasingly common in consumer and
business markets. The earliest research on these guarantees was based in economics (see,
Salop 1986) where the primary concern was probable influence of such guarantees on
oligopolistic market competition. More recently, consumer researchers have sought to
understand the effects of LPG on consumer perceptions and signaling theory has been
used as the theoretical lens for such research (e.g., Biswas et al. 2002; Jain and Srivastava
2000). Signaling theory primarily operates from the standpoint of firms and are chiefly
concerned with market conditions that determine of two types of equilibrium, pooling
equilibrium whereby all firms have the incentive of issuing the signal in question; and
pooling equilibrium whereby it is profitable for only firms possessing the characteristic
being signaled to issue the signal (see Spence 2002 for a review). Signaling theory
assumes a rational consumer and is silent on probable postpurchase consequences of
issued signals. In essence, little is known about consumer processing of market signals
and consequences of incorporating elements of such processing in current firm-based
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models of signals (Biswas, Dutta and Pullig, working paper; Kirmani and Rao 2000). The
present research primarily contributes to our current understanding of signaling theory by
demonstrating postpurchase effects of price guarantee signals. In one experiment, we
found that consumers are more willing to search for lower prices when a purchase is
made under the assurance of an LPG signal. One of the key characteristics of rationality
is the tendency to maximize utility and hence this finding is line with the assumption of
consumer rationality integral to signaling theory. However, we also found that individual
consumer characteristics such as value consciousness ad price consciousness impose a
boundary condition to consumer rationality thereby making rational response to low price
signals conditional, a possibility ignored by traditional models of signaling.
What might be a consequence of incorporating consumer propensity for
postpurchase search into signaling models? A probable effect is to limit the conditions
under which a pooling equilibrium is an efficient market outcome. Png and Hirshleifer
(1987) outlined a possible setting for sustenance of a pooling equilibrium based on
dichotomizing consumers based on the level of their market knowledge whereby even
high-priced firms can profit by issuing low price signals. We surmise that consumer
propensity for postpurchase search might serve to dissolve an existing knowledge-based
dichotomy thereby threatening sustenance of a pooling equilibrium. However, such a
possibility is contingent upon the proportion of value (price) conscious consumers in a
specific market. Knowledge-based dichotomy can help sustenance of pooling equilibrium
provided a significant proportion of the ignorant consumers are also low on value (price)
consciousness. Such a correlation between market price knowledge and consumer value
(price) is not grounded in any known theory and certainly deserves further research. More

111

critically perhaps, our research points out a need to revisit firm-based signaling models
with an objective of incorporating the issue of time in such models. By definition,
equilibrium represents a condition that is invariant in time. However, our research shows
that factoring consumers as immutable rational beings in signaling models leads to an
oversight of the possibility that model assumptions might change with time and hence
dynamic, rather than static equilibrium models are likely to be more relevant to market
signals.
We argued that if consumers are indeed more prone to postpurchase searching
following a transaction involving a low price signal, it is likely that they would encounter
prices lower than that they paid, a situation that technically constitutes a default of the
retailer’s promise of the lowest price. We conducted an experiment to test for probable
effects of LPG default. As predicted, we found that consumer perceptions of the
transacting retailer are poorer following a default, regardless of specific conditions of the
default. This indicates that consumers do not react to signals with perfect rationality.
Subjects of our experiment were instructed to assume that they were satisfied with the
purchased product’s performance and hence we can assume that until the discovery of the
LPG default, acquisition utility had been building up. This, combined with the assurance
of a refund following a possible default, should protect a rational consumer from negative
cognitive and emotional consequences following a default. However, we found that
consumers are likely to ascribe their disappointment with misplaced trust to the retailer,
even under conditions where it is rational to ascribe to the retailer’s effort to stay lowpriced (for instance, in case of a within-store default). This, combined with the findings

112

from our first experiment indicates that consumers respond to low price signals with
mixed rationality.
Findings of our second experiment further indicate that consumers harbor a
supportive notion of an LPG until there is a reason to suspect opportunistic
implementation of the tool. It appears that a within-store is at least partly attributed to
marketplace price fluctuations but a between-store default activates suspicion of
opportunistic implementation of the low price signal. A larger default is likely to make
that suspicion stronger only if the default occurs within a relatively short period of time
from the purchase. This also leads to another contribution of our research, related to the
effect of time on the intensity of consumer perceptions. Previous research has shown the
effect of time on sunk cost effects (Soman and Gourville 1998) and similarly our research
has shown the palliative effect of time on the intensity of consumer perceptions following
a signal default.
Managerial Contribution
The present research strongly indicates the need for honest intentions in issuing
low price guarantees. Low price guarantees are powerful tools in that consumers do tend
to take them at face value prior to purchase and are more likely to respond in a favorable
manner compared to when retailers do not issue such guarantees. However, our research
shows that consumers might seek to take advantage of the refund promised with an LPG,
namely, through postpurchase searching. Price guarantees issued under imperfect market
information on the part of retailers, intentionally or otherwise, might not just incur
financial losses since consumers are likely to easily detect lower market prices (given
their propensity to search) but are also likely to boomerang in the form of less favorable
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consumer perceptions of the transacting retailer. Hence, a clear prescription for retailers
is to issue low price guarantees only when they have sound information of marketplace
prices and trends for such prices.
Limitations and Future Research
One of the major limitations of our approach is reliance on a single type of low
price guarantee for our experiments. Low price guarantees widely differ in structure and
semantics and effects of such variation are not known and need to be researched. Also,
we did not have measures to properly assess the exact mechanism for the effects of LPG
default and future research should attempt to investigate this issue. Future research
should also investigate effects on other types of signals, especially quality signals with
the possibility of generalizing our theoretical contribution to signaling theory a whole.
Although we provided a certain rationale for the proposed effects related to LPG
default, our methodology lacked the tools necessary to demonstrate such rationale. Future
research should attempt to use suitable process measures to demonstrate the
psychological mechanism behind effects related to LPG default. Finally, future research
should attempt to replicate our findings with non-student subjects. This would impart
some degree of external validity to our findings.
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APPENDIX A: COMPLETE STIMULUS FOR EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION
OF 150% LPG (STUDY ONE)
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ADVERTISING SURVEY

The survey in which you are about to participate is being conducted by the
Marketing Department at Louisiana State University. Before proceeding with the
survey, we need your name and ID# so that you may be awarded class credit. The
information you provide will be kept strictly confidential.

STUDENT NAME: ________________________

Student ID #: _____________________

On the following page, you will find a print advertisement for a palmtop (PDA) sold by
a local electronics retailer. The store name and address have been intentionally blocked
out leaving a blank grey rectangular patch near the bottom of the ad. Please respond to
the questions on the following pages while viewing the attached advertisement unless
instructed otherwise. After responding to the questions related to the ad, please read the
instructions provided to complete the rest of the survey. Please respond to all questions in
a manner that most accurately reflects your opinions.

While many questions appear

similar, PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS. Thank you very much for your assistance.
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CODE #

Nobody Beats Our Prices

Toshiba Pocket PC e310: The SSLLEEEEKKEESSTT PDA!!!

The Toshiba is larger than a deck of cards



However, it is slimmer in profile.



OS Provided:
Microsoft Pocket
PC 2002
Installed
processor: Intel
StrongARM SA1110 206 MHz
Slim and lightweight; affordable;
long battery life

*We GUARANTEE that our low price for Toshiba Pocket PC e310 will not
be beaten. If – within 30 days of purchasing Toshiba Pocket PC e310 from
us, you find another local store selling this model at a lower price, we will
immediately refund you 150% of the difference.
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A. Please indicate your response to the statements below by circling the most appropriate number.
Strongly
Disagree
The price in the ad is probably the lowest price available in
the market
I will NOT risk paying too much if I buy the PDA in this ad.
I am confident about getting the PDA at the lowest possible
price if I buy from this store.
I am NOT likely to find a better price at some other store.

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

B. The following statements or questions relate to the offer in the advertisement for the Toshiba
PDA. Respond to each statement or question by circling the number that best reflects your
opinion.
Not Likely
At all
If you were to purchase a PDA, how likely is it that you
would search other stores for a lower price than that offered
in the ad?

1

Extremely
Likely
2

3

4

5

6

Not
Probable
At All
How probable is it that you would look around locally for a
price lower than that offered by the advertiser, if you had
decided to buy a PDA?

1

Very
Probable
2

3

4

5

Definitely Would Not
Check Prices At
Other Stores
If you were going to buy a PDA, would you check the prices
at other stores in search of a price lower than that you find at
the store in the advertisement?

1

2

6

7

Definitely
Would Check Prices
At Other Stores
3

4

5

6

Not Likely
At all
If you were to purchase a PDA, how likely is it that you
would search the Sunday Newspaper for locally advertised
prices that are lower than the one in the ad here?
If you were to purchase a PDA, how likely is it that you
would search the internet for a locally advertised lower price
than that offered in the ad?
If you were to purchase a PDA, how likely is it that you
would search other sources (for example, promotional
materials from local retailers) for prices that are lower than
the one in the ad here?

7

7
Extremely
Likely

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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C. What is your best estimate of the following prices?

a. Lowest price that you could find for this particular model of PDA

$_______

b. What do you think is a fair price for this particular model of PDA?

$_______

c. Highest price that you could find for this particular model of PDA

$_______

D. Please respond to the following questions.

Definitely
Unwilling
To Shop
If you were considering the purchase of the advertised
PDA, how willing would you be to shop at the store
running this advertisement?

1

Definitely
Willing
To Shop
2

3

4

5

6

Definitely
Would
Not Go
If you were thinking of purchasing the advertised PDA,
would you go to the store that advertised this PDA?

1

Definitely
Would
Go
2

3

4

5

6

Not
Probable
At All
What is the probability that you would shop at the store
running the ad, if you were considering the purchase of the
advertised PDA?

1

7

7

Very
Probable
2

3

4

5

6

Thank you for responding to these questions. Please continue to the next page.
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7

Imagine now that you have purchased the advertised PDA for $299.99 from
the store running the ad. (Please refer to the ad if necessary.) You are happy
with your decision and are quite satisfied with the performance of the PDA.
A. Now that you have purchased the advertised PDA, we would like you to respond to the following
questions.
Not likely
At all
The next time you visit a local electronics store, how likely
are you to check for a price lower than what you paid for the
Toshiba Pocket PC e310?
How likely is it that you would search the Sunday
Newspaper for locally advertised prices that are lower than
what you paid for the PDA?
How likely is it that you would search the internet for a
locally available lower price than what you paid for the
PDA?
How likely is it that you would search other sources
(catalogs from local retailers) for prices that are lower than
what you paid for the PDA?

Extremely
Likely

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

B. The following statements or questions relate to your intentions. Respond to each statement or
question by circling the number that best reflects your opinion.

Not likely
At all
How likely is it that you would search other stores for a
lower price than what you paid for the PDA?

1

Extremely
Likely
2

3

4

5

6

Not
Probable
At all
How probable is it that you would look around locally for a
price lower than what you paid for the PDA?

1

Very
Probable
2

3

4

5

Definitely Would Not
Check Prices At
Other Stores
Would you check the prices at other stores in search of a
price lower than what you paid for the PDA?

1
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7

2

6

7

Definitely
Would Check Prices
At Other Stores
3

4

5

6

7

C. Please answer the following questions about you.
Strongly
Disagree
I am very concerned about low prices, but I am equally
concerned about product quality.
When shopping, I compare the prices of different brands to
make sure I get the best value for the money.
When purchasing a product, I always try to maximize the
quality I get for the money I spend.
When I buy products, I like to be sure that I get my money’s
worth.
I generally shop around for lower prices on products, but
they still must meet certain quality requirements before I buy
them.
When I shop for groceries, I usually compare the “price per
ounce” information for brands I normally buy.
I always check prices at the grocery store to be sure I get the
best value for the money I spend.
I am not willing to go to extra effort to find lower prices.
I will shop at more than one store to take advantage of low
prices.
The money saved by finding low prices is usually not worth
the time and effort.
I would never shop at more than one store to find low prices.
The time it takes to find low prices is usually not worth the
effort.

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

D. Please answer the following questions WITHOUT referring to the advertisement.

1. Did the advertisement for the PDA offer a low price guarantee? Please check the appropriate space below to indicate your
response.
Yes _______
No _______
2. How much did the retailer promise to refund if you found a price that was lower than the advertised price?
No refund was promised
________________
100% of the price difference ________________
150% of the price difference ________________
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E. Please answer the following questions about your likely behaviors.

Not likely
At all

Extremely
Likely

How likely are you to recommend this store to your friends?
How likely are you to go back to the advertising store next
time you are thinking of buying an electronics item?
The TV channel QVC will air a comprehensive program on
PDAs, including information on market prices across the
country. The program will be aired at various times, to fit
audience’s schedules. How likely are you to watch the
program?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

F. These last questions are designed for classification purposes only. Please check the appropriate
space below with the most appropriate response.
1. Do you own PDA?
Yes

______

No

______

2. Are you considering buying a PDA?
Yes

______

No

______

3. Are you:
Male

_______

Female _______

4. How old are you?

_______

5. What is the category that best represents your annual household income?
Below $25,000
$40,001 - $55,000

______
______

$25,001 - $40,000
Above $55,000

______
______

Thank you very much for your help with this project. We greatly appreciate your time and effort.
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APPENDIX B: AD FOR EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION OF 100% LPG (STUDY ONE)
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Nobody Beats Our Prices

Toshiba Pocket PC e310: The SSLLEEEEKKEESSTT PDA!!!

The Toshiba is larger than a deck of cards



However, it is slimmer in profile.



OS Provided:
Microsoft Pocket
PC 2002
Installed
processor: Intel
StrongARM SA1110 206 MHz
Slim and lightweight; affordable;
long battery life

*We GUARANTEE that our low price for Toshiba Pocket PC e310 will not
be beaten. If – within 30 days of purchasing Toshiba Pocket PC e310 from
us, you find another local store selling this model at a lower price, we will
immediately refund you 100% of the difference.
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APPENDIX C: AD FOR CONTROL CONDITION OF NO LPG (STUDY ONE)
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The SLEEKEST PDA!!!

The Toshiba is larger than a deck of cards




However, it is slimmer in profile.
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OS Provided:
Microsoft Pocket
PC 2002
Installed
processor: Intel
StrongARM SA1110 206 MHz
Slim and lightweight; affordable;
long battery life

APPENDIX D: STIMULUS FOR PRETEST (STUDY TWO)
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The scenario and the questions on the
following page relate to an ongoing research
project at the Department of Marketing,
LSU. Please read the scenarios carefully and
respond to the questions to the best of your
knowledge and ability. You have the
researcher’s assurance that your responses
would be kept completely anonymous and
confidential. Thank you for your time and
effort.
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As consumers we often find products we have purchased at lower prices at other
stores. We would like you to imagine yourself in the scenario described below and
respond appropriately.

A.
Suppose you have bought a digital camera for $279.99 from a store which offers Low
Price Guarantees (LPG) on its products. As part of the price guarantee, the store
promises that if you find a price lower than what you paid, they will refund to you the
difference between this lower price and the price you paid.
If you were to find this product at another store at a lower price, what to you would be a
(Please provide realistic estimates):
1.

Somewhat lower price than $279.99:

$___________

2.

Substantially lower price than $279.99:

$___________

B.
How likely are you to go back to the store from which you purchased the digital camera
to get your refund if you find the somewhat lower price you indicated above?
Extremely
Unlikely
1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
Likely
7

How likely are you to go back to the store from which you purchased the digital camera
to get your refund if you find the substantially lower price you indicated above?
Extremely
Unlikely
1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
Likely
7

C.
It is understandable that going back to the store you purchased the camera from (that is,
the store that offered the LPG) would require some time and effort and would probably
not be worth it unless you find a price that is sufficiently low.
Please complete the following sentence:
“I will go back to the store I purchased the digital camera from (for $279.99) to get my
refund only if I find a price that is equal to or lower than
$ _________________________.”
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APPENDIX E: COMPLETE STIMULUS FOR “NO DEFAULT” (CONTROL)
CONDITION (STUDY TWO)
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Advertising Study

Retailers frequently offer Low Price Guarantees on
products. On the following page you will find an ad from
“Ziggy Electronics” (not the store’s real name) which has
several retail outlets in the south and southeastern U.S.
Ziggy is fairly well-respected as an electronics retailer and
sells a wide range of products such as laptop computers,
cameras, televisions, cell phones, to name a few. Ziggy’s
stores are very well designed and employees are very
friendly.
Imagine yourself as someone living in the city where this
ad is in circulation and also imagine that you are seriously
considering the purchase of a digital camera.

Please carefully study the ad on the next page and
answer the questions that follow the ad.
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000

Imagine that after searching around a little, you bought the
SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from Ziggy Electronics for
$279.99 primarily because Ziggy was offering the Low
Price Guarantee.
You are happy with your purchase because friends have
said that it is a great camera and CNET has come out with
an excellent review on the camera right after your purchase.
You look around for lower prices for the same model that
you bought, and even after a month after your purchase,
$279.99 seems to be the lowest price that the camera is
available for. You are finally convinced that Ziggy did
offer the lowest price on the camera after all.

Now, please respond to the questions on the following pages.
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A. Please indicate your opinion related to the following aspects of Ziggy Electronics
(the store you bought the camera from).

I think that Ziggy Electronics is/has (Please respond to ALL items below):

Very
Insincere

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

Very
Sincere

Very Dishonest

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

Very
Honest

Very
Undependable

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

Very
Dependable

Very
Untrustworthy

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

Very
Trustworthy

Low
Credibility

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

High
Credibility

B. Please answer the following based on your opinion of Ziggy Electronics.

Overall, I have a favorable attitude toward Ziggy Electronics.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

Indicate your ratings of Ziggy Electronics on the following scales (Please respond to ALL items below):
Bad

_______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______

Good

Unfavorable

_______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______

Favorable

Dislike

_______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______

Like
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C. Please respond to the following based on your opinion.
1. If you need an electronics product in the future, how likely are you to try Ziggy Electronics?
Not
Likely At
All
1

Extremely
Likely
2

3

4

5

6

7

2. If you ever purchase a digital camera again, how likely are you to buy it from Ziggy Electronics?
Not
Likely At
All
1

Extremely
Likely
2

3

4

5

6

7

3. How likely are you to revisit Ziggy Electronics for your shopping needs?
Not
Likely At
All
1

Extremely
Likely
2

3

4

5

6

7

D. Please respond to the following questions based on your experience and opinion.
1. How likely are you to spread negative word-of-mouth about Ziggy Electronics?
Not
Likely At
All
1

Extremely
Likely
2

3

4

5

6

7

2. I would recommend to my friends to avoid going to Ziggy Electronics.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

3. If my friends were looking for an electronics product, I would tell them NOT to go to Ziggy Electronics.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4
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5

6

7

E. Please respond to the following questions based on your feelings.
1. You feel sorry for choosing to buy the digital camera from Ziggy Electronics.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

2. You regret choosing Ziggy Electronics for your purchase.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

3. You regret for not looking around for a better price than Ziggy in the first place.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

F. Please respond to the following questions based on your opinion.
1. I think Ziggy Electronics generally offers low prices for its products.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

2. I think prices at Ziggy Electronics are generally lower compared to other stores in town.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

3. If I am looking for an electronics product, I can hope to find it at a fairly low price at Ziggy Electronics.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4
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5

6

7

G. Please answer the questions in this section WITHOUT REFERRING TO THE AD OR THE
SCENARIO.
a.

Did Ziggy Electronics offer a Low Price Guarantee?
Yes ____________

No ____________

H. Please answer the following questions about yourself.
Strongly
Disagree
I am very concerned about low prices, but I
am equally concerned about product quality.
When shopping, I compare the prices of
different brands to make sure I get the best
value for the money.
When purchasing a product, I always try to
maximize the quality I get for the money I
spend.
When I buy products, I like to be sure that I
get my money’s worth.
I generally shop around for lower prices on
products, but they still must meet certain
quality requirements before I buy them.
When I shop, I usually compare the “price
per ounce” information for brands I normally
buy.
I always check prices at the grocery store to
be sure I get the best value for the money I
spend.
I am not willing to go to extra effort to find
lower prices.
I will shop at more than one store to take
advantage of low prices.
The money saved by finding low prices is
usually not worth the time and effort.
I would never shop at more than one store to
find low prices.
The time it takes to find low prices is usually
not worth the effort.

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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I. These last questions are designed for classification purposes only. Please check the
appropriate space below with the most appropriate response.
1. Do you own a digital camera?
Yes

______

No

______

2. Are you considering buying a digital camera?
Yes

______

No

______

3. Are you:
Male

_______

Female _______

4. How old are you?

_______

5. What is the category that best represents your annual household income?
Below $25,000
$40,001 - $55,000

______
______

$25,001 - $40,000
Above $55,000

______
______

Thank you very much for your help with this project. We greatly appreciate your
time and effort.
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APPENDIX F: COMPLETE STIMULUS FOR "BETWEEN-STORE, SMALL
DEFAULT, DISTAL DEFAULT” CONDITION (STUDY TWO)

140

Imagine that after searching around a little, you bought the
SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from Ziggy Electronics for
$279.99 primarily because Ziggy was offering the Low
Price Guarantee.
You are happy with your purchase because friends have
said that it is a great camera and CNET has come out with
an excellent review on the camera right after your purchase.

After 25 Days of Your Purchase:
You find out from a friend that the model you had bought
from Ziggy is being sold at Roger’s (another well known
electronics store in the city) for $15 less, that is, for
$264.99. You call Roger’s immediately and they confirm
that the SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is being sold there at
a lower price of $264.99. You also call Ziggy Electronics
and find out that the camera is still being sold there for
$279.99, that is, the price you had originally paid.

Now, please respond to the questions on the following pages.
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F. Please indicate your opinion related to the following aspects of Ziggy Electronics
(the store you bought the camera from).

I think that Ziggy Electronics is/has (Please respond to ALL items below):

Very
Insincere

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

Very
Sincere

Very Dishonest

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

Very
Honest

Very
Undependable

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

Very
Dependable

Very
Untrustworthy

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

Very
Trustworthy

Low
Credibility

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

High
Credibility

G. Please answer the following based on your opinion of Ziggy Electronics.

Overall, I have a favorable attitude toward Ziggy Electronics.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

Indicate your ratings of Ziggy Electronics on the following scales (Please respond to ALL items below):
Bad

_______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______

Good

Unfavorable

_______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______

Favorable

Dislike

_______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______

Like
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H. Please respond to the following based on your opinion.
1. If you need an electronics product in the future, how likely are you to try Ziggy Electronics?
Not
Likely At
All
1

Extremely
Likely
2

3

4

5

6

7

2. If you ever purchase a digital camera again, how likely are you to buy it from Ziggy Electronics?
Not
Likely At
All
1

Extremely
Likely
2

3

4

5

6

7

3. How likely are you to revisit Ziggy Electronics for your shopping needs?
Not
Likely At
All
1

I.

Extremely
Likely
2

3

4

5

6

7

Please respond to the following questions based on your experience and opinion.

1. How likely are you to spread negative word-of-mouth about Ziggy Electronics?
Not
Likely At
All
1

Extremely
Likely
2

3

4

5

6

7

2. I would recommend to my friends to avoid going to Ziggy Electronics.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

3. If my friends were looking for an electronics product, I would tell them NOT to go to Ziggy Electronics.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4
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5

6

7

J. Please respond to the following questions based on your feelings.
1. You feel sorry for choosing to buy the digital camera from Ziggy Electronics.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

2. You regret choosing Ziggy Electronics for your purchase.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

3. You regret for not looking around for a better price than Ziggy in the first place.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

F. Please respond to the following questions based on your opinion and likely behavior.
1. How likely are you to go back to Ziggy Electronics to get your refund?
Not
Likely At
All
1

Extremely
Likely
2

3

4

5

6

7

2. I think Ziggy Electronics generally offers low prices for its products.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

3. I think prices at Ziggy Electronics are generally lower compared to other stores in town.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4

5

6

7

4. If I am looking for an electronics product, I can hope to find it at a fairly low price at Ziggy Electronics.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
2

3

4
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5

6

7

I.

Please answer the questions in this section WITHOUT REFERRING TO THE AD OR THE
SCENARIO.
a.

Did Ziggy Electronics offer a Low Price Guarantee?
Yes ____________

b.

No ____________

After you purchased the SONY DSC-P52, WHERE did you find a lower price for the
same camera?

 At the store I bought the camera from (Ziggy Electronics)
 At another store
c.

After you purchased the SONY DSC-P52, you found the same camera at a lower price.
How much lower was this price?

 $15
 $56
d.

How many days after your purchase did you find the lower price?



J.

2 days
25 days

Please answer the following questions about yourself.
Strongly
Disagree

I am very concerned about low prices, but I
am equally concerned about product quality.
When shopping, I compare the prices of
different brands to make sure I get the best
value for the money.
When purchasing a product, I always try to
maximize the quality I get for the money I
spend.
When I buy products, I like to be sure that I
get my money’s worth.
I generally shop around for lower prices on
products, but they still must meet certain
quality requirements before I buy them.
When I shop, I usually compare the “price
per ounce” information for brands I normally
buy.
I always check prices at the grocery store to
be sure I get the best value for the money I
spend.
I am not willing to go to extra effort to find
lower prices.

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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H. (Continued from previous page)
Strongly
Disagree
I will shop at more than one store to take
advantage of low prices.
The money saved by finding low prices is
usually not worth the time and effort.
I would never shop at more than one store to
find low prices.
The time it takes to find low prices is usually
not worth the effort.

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I. These last questions are designed for classification purposes only. Please check the
appropriate space below with the most appropriate response.
1. Do you own a digital camera?
Yes

______

No

______

2. Are you considering buying a digital camera?
Yes

______

No

______

3. Are you:
Male

_______

Female _______

4. How old are you?

_______

5. What is the category that best represents your annual household income?
Below $25,000
$40,001 - $55,000

______
______

$25,001 - $40,000
Above $55,000

______
______

Thank you very much for your help with this project. We greatly appreciate your
time and effort.
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APPENDIX G: PARTIAL STIMULUS (ALL BUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE) FOR
"WITHIN-STORE, SMALL DEFAULT, DISTAL DEFAULT” CONDITION
(STUDY TWO)
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Advertising Study

Retailers frequently offer Low Price Guarantees on
products. On the following page you will find an ad from
“Ziggy Electronics” (not the store’s real name) which has
several retail outlets in the south and southeastern U.S.
Ziggy is fairly well-respected as an electronics retailer and
sells a wide range of products such as laptop computers,
cameras, televisions, cell phones, to name a few. Ziggy’s
stores are very well designed and employees are very
friendly.
Imagine yourself as someone living in the city where this
ad is in circulation and also imagine that you are seriously
considering the purchase of a digital camera.

Please carefully study the ad on the next page and
answer the questions that follow the ad.
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Nobody Beats Our Prices

SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52: The SSO
OLLIID
D Digital Camera!!!



Resolution:
3.2 Mega pixels



Memory Type:
Memory Stick, Memory
Stick Pro Compatible



Included Accessories:
Rechargeable AA NiMH
Batteries, Battery
Charger, AV Cable, USB
Cable, Wrist Strap, 16
MB Memory Stick,
Software CD-ROM

*We GUARANTEE that our price for SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is the
lowest available in the market. If – within 30 days of purchasing SONY
Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from us, you find us or another local store selling this
model at a lower price, we will refund you 120% of the difference.
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Please the answer the following questions based on the ad on the previous page. You
may look at the ad anytime to answer any of the questions.
What is the price for which Ziggy is offering the digital camera?
$ _______________________.
Does Ziggy offer a low price guarantee on the product?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if later you find the same digital camera at a lower price at
another store?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if you later find the same digital camera at a lower price at
Ziggy Electronics itself?



Yes
No

If you later find a lower price at Ziggy or elsewhere, how what percentage of the price
difference will Ziggy refund?
________________.
For how long is Ziggy’s price guarantee valid?
For ____________ days from purchase.

Next, please carefully read the scenario on the following
page and answer the questions that follow.
150

Imagine that after searching around a little, you bought the
SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from Ziggy Electronics for
$279.99 primarily because Ziggy was offering the Low
Price Guarantee.
You are happy with your purchase because friends have
said that it is a great camera and CNET has come out with
an excellent review on the camera right after your purchase.

After 25 Days of Your Purchase:
You find out from a friend that the model you had bought
from Ziggy is being sold at Ziggy Electronics itself for $15
less, that is, for $264.99. You call Ziggy immediately and
they confirm that the SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is being
sold there at a lower price of $264.99.

Now, please respond to the questions on the following pages.
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APPENDIX H: PARTIAL STIMULUS (ALL BUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE) FOR
"BETWEEN-STORE, LARGE DEFAULT, DISTAL DEFAULT” CONDITION
(STUDY TWO)

152

Advertising Study

Retailers frequently offer Low Price Guarantees on
products. On the following page you will find an ad from
“Ziggy Electronics” (not the store’s real name) which has
several retail outlets in the south and southeastern U.S.
Ziggy is fairly well-respected as an electronics retailer and
sells a wide range of products such as laptop computers,
cameras, televisions, cell phones, to name a few. Ziggy’s
stores are very well designed and employees are very
friendly.
Imagine yourself as someone living in the city where this
ad is in circulation and also imagine that you are seriously
considering the purchase of a digital camera.

Please carefully study the ad on the next page and
answer the questions that follow the ad.
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Nobody Beats Our Prices

SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52: The SSO
OLLIID
D Digital Camera!!!



Resolution:
3.2 Mega pixels



Memory Type:
Memory Stick, Memory
Stick Pro Compatible



Included Accessories:
Rechargeable AA NiMH
Batteries, Battery
Charger, AV Cable, USB
Cable, Wrist Strap, 16
MB Memory Stick,
Software CD-ROM

*We GUARANTEE that our price for SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is the
lowest available in the market. If – within 30 days of purchasing SONY
Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from us, you find us or another local store selling this
model at a lower price, we will refund you 120% of the difference.
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Please the answer the following questions based on the ad on the previous page. You
may look at the ad anytime to answer any of the questions.
What is the price for which Ziggy is offering the digital camera?
$ _______________________.
Does Ziggy offer a low price guarantee on the product?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if later you find the same digital camera at a lower price at
another store?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if you later find the same digital camera at a lower price at
Ziggy Electronics itself?



Yes
No

If you later find a lower price at Ziggy or elsewhere, how what percentage of the price
difference will Ziggy refund?
________________.
For how long is Ziggy’s price guarantee valid?
For ____________ days from purchase.

Next, please carefully read the scenario on the following
page and answer the questions that follow.
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Imagine that after searching around a little, you bought the
SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from Ziggy Electronics for
$279.99 primarily because Ziggy was offering the Low
Price Guarantee.
You are happy with your purchase because friends have
said that it is a great camera and CNET has come out with
an excellent review on the camera right after your purchase.

After 25 Days of Your Purchase:
You find out from a friend that the model you had bought
from Ziggy is being sold at Roger’s (another well known
electronics store in the city) for $56 less, that is, for
$223.99. You call Roger’s immediately and they confirm
that the SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is being sold there at
a lower price of $223.99. You also call Ziggy Electronics
and find out that the camera is still being sold there for
$279.99, that is, the price you had originally paid.

Now, please respond to the questions on the following pages.
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APPENDIX I: PARTIAL STIMULUS (ALL BUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE) FOR
"WITHIN-STORE, LARGE DEFAULT, DISTAL DEFAULT” CONDITION
(STUDY TWO)
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Advertising Study

Retailers frequently offer Low Price Guarantees on
products. On the following page you will find an ad from
“Ziggy Electronics” (not the store’s real name) which has
several retail outlets in the south and southeastern U.S.
Ziggy is fairly well-respected as an electronics retailer and
sells a wide range of products such as laptop computers,
cameras, televisions, cell phones, to name a few. Ziggy’s
stores are very well designed and employees are very
friendly.
Imagine yourself as someone living in the city where this
ad is in circulation and also imagine that you are seriously
considering the purchase of a digital camera.

Please carefully study the ad on the next page and
answer the questions that follow the ad.

158

Nobody Beats Our Prices

SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52: The SSO
OLLIID
D Digital Camera!!!



Resolution:
3.2 Mega pixels



Memory Type:
Memory Stick, Memory
Stick Pro Compatible



Included Accessories:
Rechargeable AA NiMH
Batteries, Battery
Charger, AV Cable, USB
Cable, Wrist Strap, 16
MB Memory Stick,
Software CD-ROM

*We GUARANTEE that our price for SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is the
lowest available in the market. If – within 30 days of purchasing SONY
Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from us, you find us or another local store selling this
model at a lower price, we will refund you 120% of the difference.
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Please the answer the following questions based on the ad on the previous page. You
may look at the ad anytime to answer any of the questions.
What is the price for which Ziggy is offering the digital camera?
$ _______________________.
Does Ziggy offer a low price guarantee on the product?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if later you find the same digital camera at a lower price at
another store?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if you later find the same digital camera at a lower price at
Ziggy Electronics itself?



Yes
No

If you later find a lower price at Ziggy or elsewhere, how what percentage of the price
difference will Ziggy refund?
________________.
For how long is Ziggy’s price guarantee valid?
For ____________ days from purchase.

Next, please carefully read the scenario on the following
page and answer the questions that follow.
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Imagine that after searching around a little, you bought the
SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from Ziggy Electronics for
$279.99 primarily because Ziggy was offering the Low
Price Guarantee.
You are happy with your purchase because friends have
said that it is a great camera and CNET has come out with
an excellent review on the camera right after your purchase.

After 25 Days of Your Purchase:
You find out from a friend that the model you had bought
from Ziggy is being sold at Ziggy Electronics itself for $56
less, that is, for $223.99. You call Ziggy immediately and
they confirm that the SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is being
sold there at a lower price of $223.99.

Now, please respond to the questions on the following pages.
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APPENDIX J: PARTIAL STIMULUS (ALL BUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE) FOR
"BETWEEN-STORE, SMALL DEFAULT, PROXIMAL DEFAULT”
CONDITION (STUDY TWO)
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Advertising Study

Retailers frequently offer Low Price Guarantees on
products. On the following page you will find an ad from
“Ziggy Electronics” (not the store’s real name) which has
several retail outlets in the south and southeastern U.S.
Ziggy is fairly well-respected as an electronics retailer and
sells a wide range of products such as laptop computers,
cameras, televisions, cell phones, to name a few. Ziggy’s
stores are very well designed and employees are very
friendly.
Imagine yourself as someone living in the city where this
ad is in circulation and also imagine that you are seriously
considering the purchase of a digital camera.

Please carefully study the ad on the next page and
answer the questions that follow the ad.
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Nobody Beats Our Prices

SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52: The SSO
OLLIID
D Digital Camera!!!



Resolution:
3.2 Mega pixels



Memory Type:
Memory Stick, Memory
Stick Pro Compatible



Included Accessories:
Rechargeable AA NiMH
Batteries, Battery
Charger, AV Cable, USB
Cable, Wrist Strap, 16
MB Memory Stick,
Software CD-ROM

*We GUARANTEE that our price for SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is the
lowest available in the market. If – within 30 days of purchasing SONY
Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from us, you find us or another local store selling this
model at a lower price, we will refund you 120% of the difference.
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Please the answer the following questions based on the ad on the previous page. You
may look at the ad anytime to answer any of the questions.
What is the price for which Ziggy is offering the digital camera?
$ _______________________.
Does Ziggy offer a low price guarantee on the product?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if later you find the same digital camera at a lower price at
another store?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if you later find the same digital camera at a lower price at
Ziggy Electronics itself?



Yes
No

If you later find a lower price at Ziggy or elsewhere, how what percentage of the price
difference will Ziggy refund?
________________.
For how long is Ziggy’s price guarantee valid?
For ____________ days from purchase.

Next, please carefully read the scenario on the following
page and answer the questions that follow.
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Imagine that after searching around a little, you bought the
SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from Ziggy Electronics for
$279.99 primarily because Ziggy was offering the Low
Price Guarantee.
You are happy with your purchase because friends have
said that it is a great camera and CNET has come out with
an excellent review on the camera right after your purchase.

After 2 Days of Your Purchase:
You find out from a friend that the model you had bought
from Ziggy is being sold at Roger’s (another well known
electronics store in the city) for $15 less, that is, for
$264.99. You call Roger’s immediately and they confirm
that the SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is being sold there at
a lower price of $264.99. You also call Ziggy Electronics
and find out that the camera is still being sold there for
$279.99, that is, the price you had originally paid.

Now, please respond to the questions on the following pages.
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APPENDIX K: PARTIAL STIMULUS (ALL BUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE) FOR
"BETWEEN-STORE, LARGE DEFAULT, PROXIMAL DEFAULT”
CONDITION (STUDY TWO)
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Advertising Study

Retailers frequently offer Low Price Guarantees on
products. On the following page you will find an ad from
“Ziggy Electronics” (not the store’s real name) which has
several retail outlets in the south and southeastern U.S.
Ziggy is fairly well-respected as an electronics retailer and
sells a wide range of products such as laptop computers,
cameras, televisions, cell phones, to name a few. Ziggy’s
stores are very well designed and employees are very
friendly.
Imagine yourself as someone living in the city where this
ad is in circulation and also imagine that you are seriously
considering the purchase of a digital camera.

Please carefully study the ad on the next page and
answer the questions that follow the ad.
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Nobody Beats Our Prices

SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52: The SSO
OLLIID
D Digital Camera!!!



Resolution:
3.2 Mega pixels



Memory Type:
Memory Stick, Memory
Stick Pro Compatible



Included Accessories:
Rechargeable AA NiMH
Batteries, Battery
Charger, AV Cable, USB
Cable, Wrist Strap, 16
MB Memory Stick,
Software CD-ROM

*We GUARANTEE that our price for SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is the
lowest available in the market. If – within 30 days of purchasing SONY
Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from us, you find us or another local store selling this
model at a lower price, we will refund you 120% of the difference.
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Please the answer the following questions based on the ad on the previous page. You
may look at the ad anytime to answer any of the questions.
What is the price for which Ziggy is offering the digital camera?
$ _______________________.
Does Ziggy offer a low price guarantee on the product?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if later you find the same digital camera at a lower price at
another store?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if you later find the same digital camera at a lower price at
Ziggy Electronics itself?



Yes
No

If you later find a lower price at Ziggy or elsewhere, how what percentage of the price
difference will Ziggy refund?
________________.
For how long is Ziggy’s price guarantee valid?
For ____________ days from purchase.

Next, please carefully read the scenario on the following
page and answer the questions that follow.
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Imagine that after searching around a little, you decided to
buy the SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from Ziggy
Electronics for $279.99 primarily because Ziggy was
offering the Low Price Guarantee.
You are happy with your purchase because friends have
said that it is a great camera and CNET has come out with
an excellent review on the camera right after your purchase.

After 2 Days of Your Purchase:
You find out from a friend that the model you had bought
from Ziggy is being sold at Roger’s (another well known
electronics store in the city) for $56 less, that is, for
$223.99. You call Roger’s immediately and they confirm
that the SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is being sold there at
a lower price of $223.99. You also call Ziggy Electronics
and find out that the camera is still being sold there for
$279.99, that is, the price you had originally paid.

Now, please respond to the questions on the following pages.
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APPENDIX L: PARTIAL STIMULUS (ALL BUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE) FOR
"WITHIN-STORE, LARGE DEFAULT, PROXIMAL DEFAULT” CONDITION
(STUDY TWO)

172

Advertising Study

Retailers frequently offer Low Price Guarantees on
products. On the following page you will find an ad from
“Ziggy Electronics” (not the store’s real name) which has
several retail outlets in the south and southeastern U.S.
Ziggy is fairly well-respected as an electronics retailer and
sells a wide range of products such as laptop computers,
cameras, televisions, cell phones, to name a few. Ziggy’s
stores are very well designed and employees are very
friendly.
Imagine yourself as someone living in the city where this
ad is in circulation and also imagine that you are seriously
considering the purchase of a digital camera.

Please carefully study the ad on the next page and
answer the questions that follow the ad.
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Nobody Beats Our Prices

SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52: The SSO
OLLIID
D Digital Camera!!!



Resolution:
3.2 Mega pixels



Memory Type:
Memory Stick, Memory
Stick Pro Compatible



Included Accessories:
Rechargeable AA NiMH
Batteries, Battery
Charger, AV Cable, USB
Cable, Wrist Strap, 16
MB Memory Stick,
Software CD-ROM

*We GUARANTEE that our price for SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is the
lowest available in the market. If – within 30 days of purchasing SONY
Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from us, you find us or another local store selling this
model at a lower price, we will refund you 120% of the difference.
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Please the answer the following questions based on the ad on the previous page. You
may look at the ad anytime to answer any of the questions.
What is the price for which Ziggy is offering the digital camera?
$ _______________________.
Does Ziggy offer a low price guarantee on the product?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if later you find the same digital camera at a lower price at
another store?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if you later find the same digital camera at a lower price at
Ziggy Electronics itself?



Yes
No

If you later find a lower price at Ziggy or elsewhere, how what percentage of the price
difference will Ziggy refund?
________________.
For how long is Ziggy’s price guarantee valid?
For ____________ days from purchase.

Next, please carefully read the scenario on the following
page and answer the questions that follow.
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Imagine that after searching around a little, you bought the
SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from Ziggy Electronics for
$279.99 primarily because Ziggy was offering the Low
Price Guarantee.
You are happy with your purchase because friends have
said that it is a great camera and CNET has come out with
an excellent review on the camera right after your purchase.

After 2 Days of Your Purchase:
You find out from a friend that the model you had bought
from Ziggy is being sold at Ziggy Electronics itself for $56
less, that is, for $223.99. You call Ziggy immediately and
they confirm that the SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is being
sold there at a lower price of $223.99.

Now, please respond to the questions on the following pages.
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APPENDIX M: PARTIAL STIMULUS (ALL BUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE) FOR
"WITHIN-STORE, SMALL DEFAULT, PROXIMAL DEFAULT” CONDITION
(STUDY TWO)

177

Advertising Study

Retailers frequently offer Low Price Guarantees on
products. On the following page you will find an ad from
“Ziggy Electronics” (not the store’s real name) which has
several retail outlets in the south and southeastern U.S.
Ziggy is fairly well-respected as an electronics retailer and
sells a wide range of products such as laptop computers,
cameras, televisions, cell phones, to name a few. Ziggy’s
stores are very well designed and employees are very
friendly.
Imagine yourself as someone living in the city where this
ad is in circulation and also imagine that you are seriously
considering the purchase of a digital camera.

Please carefully study the ad on the next page and
answer the questions that follow the ad.
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Nobody Beats Our Prices

SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52: The SSO
OLLIID
D Digital Camera!!!



Resolution:
3.2 Mega pixels



Memory Type:
Memory Stick, Memory
Stick Pro Compatible



Included Accessories:
Rechargeable AA NiMH
Batteries, Battery
Charger, AV Cable, USB
Cable, Wrist Strap, 16
MB Memory Stick,
Software CD-ROM

*We GUARANTEE that our price for SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is the
lowest available in the market. If – within 30 days of purchasing SONY
Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from us, you find us or another local store selling this
model at a lower price, we will refund you 120% of the difference.
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Please the answer the following questions based on the ad on the previous page. You
may look at the ad anytime to answer any of the questions.
What is the price for which Ziggy is offering the digital camera?
$ _______________________.
Does Ziggy offer a low price guarantee on the product?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if later you find the same digital camera at a lower price at
another store?



Yes
No

Will Ziggy refund any money if you later find the same digital camera at a lower price at
Ziggy Electronics itself?



Yes
No

If you later find a lower price at Ziggy or elsewhere, how what percentage of the price
difference will Ziggy refund?
________________.
For how long is Ziggy’s price guarantee valid?
For ____________ days from purchase.

Next, please carefully read the scenario on the following
page and answer the questions that follow.
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Imagine that after searching around a little, you bought the
SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 from Ziggy Electronics for
$279.99 primarily because Ziggy was offering the Low
Price Guarantee.
You are happy with your purchase because friends have
said that it is a great camera and CNET has come out with
an excellent review on the camera right after your purchase.

After 2 Days of Your Purchase:
You find out from a friend that the model you had bought
from Ziggy is being sold at Ziggy Electronics itself for $15
less, that is, for $264.99. You call Ziggy immediately and
they confirm that the SONY Cyber Shot DSC-P52 is being
sold there at a lower price of $264.99.

Now, please respond to the questions on the following pages.
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